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Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández*
Only recently has imprisonment become a central feature of
both civil and criminal immigration law enforcement. Apart from
harms to individuals and communities arising from other types of
immigration enforcement, such as removal, imprisonment comes with
its own severe consequences, and yet it is relatively ignored. This
Article is the first to define a new prison population as those
imprisoned as a result of suspected or actual immigration law
violations, whether civil or criminal—a population that now numbers
more than half a million individuals a year. It is also the first to
systematically map the many civil and criminal entryways into
immigration imprisonment across every level of government.
Examining the population of immigration prisoners as a whole
provides crucial insights into how we arrived at this state of largescale immigration imprisonment. While political motivations similar
to those that fueled the rapid expansion of criminal hyperincarceration may have started the trend, this Article demonstrates
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that key legal and policy choices explain how imprisonment has
become an entrenched feature of immigration law enforcement. In
fact, legislators and immigration officials have locked themselves
into this choice: there are now billions of dollars, tens of thousands
of prison beds, and hundreds of third parties invested in maintaining
and expanding the use of immigration imprisonment. Using the
literature on path dependence and legal legitimacy, this Article
explains the phenomenon of immigration imprisonment as a single
category that spans all levels of government. The Article concludes
by suggesting that policy makers, rather than continuing further
along this path, should seek a future that reflects immigration law
enforcement’s past—when imprisonment was the exception rather
than the norm.
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INTRODUCTION
Immigration law enforcement is a feature of both the civil administrative
law process and the criminal justice system. On the civil side, federal
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immigration officials in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) use an
array of initiatives, tens of thousands of personnel, and billions of dollars to
enforce civil immigration law, which governs who can be admitted into the
United States and what conditions they must meet to stay here.1 In the criminal
justice system, the same federal agencies that investigate and enforce all types
of federal criminal laws also police suspected violations of federal immigration
crimes, such as unauthorized entry and unauthorized reentry into the United
States.2 State and local counterparts often engage in similar activities, having
vigorously turned to their traditional police powers to regulate unwanted
activity related to migrant status.3
Whether characterized as a matter of civil or criminal law, and whether
carried out by federal, state, or local officials, every type of immigration law
enforcement shares a common central feature: imprisonment.4 While
differences exist, the government subjects all immigration prisoners to its
coercive powers through forcible confinement in secure facilities where
detainees are closely watched and access is limited. The vast majority of people
detained due to immigration law violations are held in jails, prisons, or other
secure facilities that are modeled on those designed for prisoners awaiting
criminal proceedings or serving sentences. Not surprisingly, all of the criminal
detainees are kept in jails and prisons. Roughly half of the approximately 250
facilities where DHS holds civil immigration detainees function as jails and
prisons that do not purport to be anything but penal institutions. Most of DHS’s
remaining civil immigration detainees are confined in secure structures
designed to include many of the hallmarks of prisons and jails: involuntary
confinement, strictly controlled access, barbed wire, steel doors, closely
watched movements, and more.5
Every year, these facilities house vast numbers of people. In the criminal
context, the United States Marshals Service (USMS), the federal agency
responsible for detaining people suspected of violating federal criminal law,
arrested and booked 82,255 people for a suspected immigration offense in

1. See infra Part II.A.
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. See infra Part II.C.
4. In this Article, “imprisonment” is an umbrella term that includes any form of secure
confinement regardless of which governmental unit carries out the confinement, the legal authority
that permits it, or the stringency of the conditions of confinement. See Matthew Groves, Immigration
Detention vs Imprisonment: Differences Explored, 29 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 228, 229 (2004) (“The core
elements of imprisonment are forced detention and coercive treatment.”). “Detention” and
“immigration detention,” in contrast, refer to confinement through ICE’s civil administrative law
enforcement powers. See Robyn Sampson & Grant Mitchell, Global Trends in Immigration Detention
and Alternatives to Detention: Practical, Political and Symbolic Rationales, 1 J. ON MIGRATION &
HUM. SECURITY 97, 99 (2013). I use “confinement” and “incarceration” interchangeably to signify the
experience of forcible living in a secured environment where volitional entry and exit are not allowed.
5. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2009).
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fiscal year 2010, 83,206 in fiscal year 2011, and 85,458 in fiscal year 2012.6
Though several immigration-related crimes exist, the most commonly
prosecuted include unauthorized entry (a federal misdemeanor) and
unauthorized reentry (a federal felony).7
Additionally, convicted immigration offenders have risen as a percentage
of the federal prison population, hitting 12 percent in 2012 when 23,700 people
convicted of an immigration crime spent time in a federal prison on a given
day.8 Some states have taken immigration law matters into their own hands by
using purported state authority to imprison individuals who engage in specified
immigration activity.9
Alongside criminal incarceration, DHS used its civil immigration
detention authority to confine 477,523 people in fiscal year 201210—the largest
civil immigration detention population in modern times.11 DHS confined these
individuals for alleged violations of civil immigration law provisions (e.g.,
being physically present in the United States without authorization).12 In total,
hundreds of thousands of people are incarcerated each year for allegedly
engaging in nonviolent immigration activity prohibited by state or federal civil
or criminal law—or, in some instances, both. These violations range from
entering the United States without the federal government’s permission to
using an invented social security number to gain employment.
Evidence shows that migrants suffer unthinkable harms while
imprisoned.13 At the same time, policies regulating migration have not only
remained indifferent to these realities, but have become increasingly punitive
over the last thirty years.

6. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248493, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,
2011–2012, at 3 tbl.2 (2015).
7. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326 (2012).
8. See E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 243920,
PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991–2012, at 43 app. tbl.10 (2013)
(providing federal prison population data for individuals sentenced to more than one year
imprisonment and incarcerated on December 31 of 2002, 2011, and 2012). On December 31, 2011,
there were 22,043 people imprisoned because of a federal immigration crime and on that date in 2002
there were 15,628 such prisoners. Id.
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. JOHN F. SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL
REPORT: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012, at 5 (2013).
11. This is likely the largest civil immigration detention population ever in the United States,
but reliable data for the late-nineteenth century and much of the twentieth century are unavailable.
12. See INA § 212(a)(6) (rendering inadmissible any migrant who was not admitted or paroled
into the United States); id. § 237(a)(1)(B) (rendering deportable any migrant present in the United
States in violation of any INA provision).
13. As used in this Article, the term “migrant” refers to people who were not United States
citizens when they physically entered the United States. See Nicholas De Genova, The Legal
Production of Mexican/Migrant “Illegality,” in GOVERNING IMMIGRATION THROUGH CRIME 41, 41
(Julie A. Dowling & Jonathan Xavier Inda eds., 2013). I use this term rather than “immigrant” because
the latter has a specialized definition for purposes of immigration law that does not precisely conform
to the individuals who this Article discusses. See INA § 101(a)(15).
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Imprisonment, then, befalls people who engage in prohibited
immigration-related conduct through both criminal- and civil-law processes.
Because confinement in these instances turns on migrant status or on activity
inextricably tied to being a migrant (e.g., hiring someone to transport you
clandestinely into the United States), viewing the practice of locking up
migrants as a single, multi-stranded phenomenon of immigration imprisonment
better reflects the reality of immigration law enforcement today than
demarcating distinctions based on criminal- or civil-law powers. As former
immigration detainee Malik Ndaula put it, to those locked up—the nation’s
immigration prisoners—“prison is prison no matter what label you use.”14
A number of explanations for immigration imprisonment’s remarkable
scale pervade. Many commentators point to the 1996 amendments to the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) that dramatically expanded the
so-called “mandatory detention” provision. Some point to the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.15 Others argue that
Congress’s insistence on a “bed mandate,” requiring DHS to pay for a specified
number of detention beds every year, means DHS has no choice but to detain
so many people.16 Still others claim that lobbyists for private prison
corporations promote legislation to expand detention.17
Though all of these explanations have some truth, none fully appreciate
the depth, subtlety, and ingrained nature of the policy initiatives, legislative
processes, statutory requirements, and administrative decisions that promote
immigration imprisonment. As the first to systematically consider
imprisonment as the defining feature of immigration law enforcement in the
United States today, this Article provides the comprehensive picture of
immigration imprisonment necessary to understand why so many people are
confined for violating immigration laws. In doing so, it shows why and how
14. Malik Ndaula & Debbie Satyal, Rafiu’s Story: An American Immigrant Nightmare, in
KEEPING OUT THE OTHER: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT TODAY
241, 250 (David C. Brotherton & Philip Kretsedemas eds., 2008).
15. See, e.g., Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention,
45 HARV. CIV. RTS.–CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 601, 610–11 (2010) (explaining that the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty of 1996 “toughened . . . immigration detention” and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 “expanded the scope of mandatory
detention”); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After
September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 89–91 (2005) (discussing the federal government’s
use of immigration detention after September 11, 2001).
16. David Brancaccio, “Bed Mandate” Ensures 34,000 Immigrants Are Detained Each Day,
MARKETPLACE (Oct. 18, 2013, 7:54 AM), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/economy/bed-mandateensures-34000-immigrants-are-detained-each-day; Ted Robbins, Little-Known Immigration Mandate
Keeps Detention Beds Full, NPR (Nov. 19, 2013, 3:05 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/11/19
/245968601/little-known-immigration-mandate-keeps-detention-beds-full.
17. See William Selway & Margaret Newkirk, Congress’s Illegal-Immigration Detention
Quota Costs $2 Billion a Year, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-09-26/congresss-illegal-immigration-detention-quotacosts-2-billion-a-year; Graeme Wood, A Boom Behind Bars, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 17,
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/11_13/b4221076266454.htm.
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imprisonment has become a normal, routine, and self-replicating feature of
immigration policing—that is, why and how immigration imprisonment has
naturalized.
The growth in criminal incarceration is well-established in the academic
literature of multiple disciplines.18 In contrast, academic commentary,
including legal scholarship, has largely failed to study the immigration prison
population.19
This Article makes three unique contributions to the imprisonment
literature. First, it spans civil and criminal confinement to define a new form of
imprisonment—immigration imprisonment. Immigration imprisonment can be
usefully conceptualized as a single policy choice and analyzed as a whole,
regardless of the legal process or government action from which the
imprisonment may result. Second, for the first time, this Article maps the full
list of pathways through which migrants are imprisoned by federal, state, or
local government laws and practices. Third, the Article argues that, beyond
political forces, institutional decision-making processes and legal directives
propel the growth of immigration imprisonment and make it a naturalized
phenomenon.
To unravel imprisonment’s ingrained role in the modern immigration law
enforcement regime, this Article proceeds in six parts. Part I lays out the
personal and societal harms of imprisoning migrants for immigration-related
activities that, unlike the conduct that drove criminal hyperincarceration,20 are
often not criminal transgressions at all (they are violations of civil law) and
almost never involve an easily discernible harm. Despite this, federal, state, and
local governments have come to rely on confinement as a central means of
enforcing immigration law. In doing so, they have created a population of
people conceptualized in Part II as immigration prisoners.
Part II identifies the civil and criminal powers federal and state
governments wield to create the population of immigration prisoners. Federal,
state, and local governments have used specific enforcement and prosecution

18. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); STEPHEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, WHY ARE SO
MANY AMERICANS IN PRISON? (2013).
19. For notable exceptions in the legal scholarship, see Alina Das, Immigration Detention:
Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137 (2013); Heeren, supra
note 15, at 610–11; Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42
(2010); Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for
Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63 (2012).
For my own earlier articulation of a theory of the political forces propelling immigration
imprisonment’s growth, see generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration,
2013 BYU L. REV. 1457.
20. See Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America,
DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 74, 78 (contending that “hyperincarceration” better describes the
modern use of imprisonment in the United States than the more common “mass incarceration” because
hyperincarceration accounts for imprisonment that is overwhelmingly used against poor black men).
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initiatives to develop numerous entryways into the immigration-imprisonment
pipeline. Part III maps these entryways before explaining how
intergovernmental law enforcement tactics, which blend criminal and civil
immigration law into what scholars have recently begun to describe as
“crimmigration” law, create large-scale incarceration.21
Part IV explains why immigration imprisonment became a central feature
of civil and criminal immigration law enforcement. It did so, this Part contends,
because immigration has become overrun by the rhetoric of criminality.
Specifically, beginning in the 1980s, immigration came to be viewed as a
security threat that needed to be managed alongside other dangers.
Grounded in the rhetoric of criminality, Part V explains how immigration
imprisonment has become deeply entrenched in immigration policy making
and enforcement. Legislators and officials have become so tied to earlier
decisions to use imprisonment that they rely on it by default, even in the face of
reasonable alternatives. In turn, reliance on imprisonment has fueled a host of
third parties who have staked their economic well-being on this lawenforcement policy choice, and who have every reason to pressure government
officials to maintain and expand immigration imprisonment.
Difficult as it is to see an alternative to the growing push to imprison more
migrants because of immigration activity, Part VI posits an alternative
paradigm rooted in immigration law’s past reluctance to rely on confinement
and inspired by a recent contraction of the criminal prison population. Just as
immigration imprisonment expanded, Part VI suggests that it can shrink if
policy makers so choose.
I.
HARMS OF IMMIGRATION IMPRISONMENT
Immigration imprisonment is often considered a mere corollary to
removal. However, in reality, it is so coercive, widespread, and racially skewed
that it causes numerous independent harms—not only to migrants, but also to
communities, and to the legitimacy of the immigration law system itself. These

21. Legal scholar Juliet Stumpf coined the term “crimmigration” in a 2006 article. Juliet
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367
(2006). Analysis of this area of law has expanded quite rapidly since then. See, e.g., Jennifer M.
Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009),
http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/135_Chacon.pdf; Ingrid V. Eagly,
Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1126 (2013); García Hernández, supra note 19, at 1457; Yolanda Vazquez, Advising Noncitizen
Defendants on the Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: The Ethical Answer for the
Criminal Defense Lawyer, the Court, and the Sixth Amendment, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 31
(2010). For the first book-length collection of scholarly essays explicitly addressing crimmigration, see
SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR (Maria João Guia et al. eds.,
2013).
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effects arise regardless of whether imprisonment stems from civil- or criminallaw powers, or from federal, state, or local law enforcement initiatives.
A. Policy Failures
Measuring a law enforcement policy’s performance is never
straightforward.22 While many factors play a role in how an imprisonment
regime fares, two stand out as particularly salient to immigration
imprisonment: effectiveness and efficiency.23 First, we must consider whether
confinement achieves the goals of the respective substantive legal regime.
Second, to the extent imprisonment meets these goals, we must address
whether alternative policies could reach a substantially similar result at a lower
financial and social cost. A clear-eyed assessment indicates that the costs of
immigration imprisonment far outweigh its benefits. This is true for three
reasons: (1) detention is overbroad; (2) it results in immense damage to migrant
communities; and (3) it imposes significant financial costs on the federal
government, even in the face of dramatically less expensive and more effective
alternatives.
Civil and criminal law authorize immigration imprisonment to promote a
limited number of goals. First, in the civil context, unless a migrant is subject
to mandatory detention, the migrant can only be confined while removal
proceedings are pending if the migrant is either a flight risk or a danger to the
community.24 The INA’s mandatory detention provision, section 236(c),
suggests that, in Congress’s view, everyone who has committed one of the
many crimes that lead to mandatory detention presents a risk of absconding or
endangering the public.25 Thus, if an immigration judge orders a migrant
removed from the United States, civil immigration detention is allowed to
ensure that the government can locate the migrant when space on an outgoing
bus or airplane becomes available. Second, in the penal context, confinement

22. See, e.g., ARJEN BOIN, CRAFTING PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS: LEADERSHIP IN TWO PRISON
SYSTEMS 196 (2001) (“Measuring the performance of criminal justice systems is, for an abundance of
reasons, a problematic affair.”); MARK H. MOORE & ANTHONY BRAGA, POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH
FORUM, THE “BOTTOM LINE” OF POLICING 9 (2003) (acknowledging the difficulty of measuring the
value of policing); BEN A. VOLLAARD, POLICE EFFECTIVENESS: MEASUREMENT AND INCENTIVES 1
(2006) (lamenting an “absence of good indicators of police performance”).
23. See BOIN, supra note 23, at 197 tbl.7.1 (listing several standards by which to evaluate
prison systems, including efficiency); John E. Eck & Dennis P. Rosenbaum, The New Police Order:
Effectiveness, Equity, and Efficiency in Community Policing, in THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY
POLICING: TESTING THE PROMISES 3, 5 (Dennis P. Rosenbaum ed., 1994) (positing that the public
asks for three things from the police: effective, equitable, and efficient law enforcement). This Part
discusses effectiveness and efficiency, while Part I.B discusses equity.
24. See Ellis, 20 I. & N. Dec. 641, 642 (B.I.A. 1993) (citing Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666 (B.I.A.
1976)).
25. INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518–20
(2003) (explaining that Congress adopted section 236(c) “against a backdrop of wholesale failure by
the INS to deal with increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens” who posed a public safety threat by
committing more crimes and frequently absconding when released from civil immigration detention).
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pending federal criminal proceedings (regardless of the offense) is allowed if
the defendant is deemed at risk of absconding or endangering the public.26
Upon conviction, U.S. courts permit incarceration as a means to punish the
defendant and deter future violations.27 Convicted migrants are then subject to
the very real possibility of forcible removal from the United States.
Immigration imprisonment largely fails to accomplish these goals. To
begin, many civil detainees present little if any risk of absconding or
endangering the community if released.28 A substantial portion have spent
many years in the United States, during which time they have developed deep
ties to the community, while others are coming or returning to join family
members.29 The more involved a person is with her community, the less likely
she is to abscond.30 Furthermore, the vast majority of detainees (89 percent in
2009) have never been convicted of a violent offense.31 There is no reason to
believe that a person who has not engaged in violent crime in the past will do
so in the future. Moreover, the INA’s mandatory detention provision does not
even pretend to consider an individual’s dangerousness or likelihood of
absconding. Congress, the Supreme Court has explained, may subject migrants
to civil immigration detention merely for having been involved in criminal
activity in the past (or for possessing any other characteristics that Congress
deems worthy of detention).32 Congress has done just this through INA section
236(c).
This rationale applies to criminal pretrial detainees as well. Migrants are
no less likely to have family members in the United States because they have
been apprehended and prosecuted through the criminal immigration law
enforcement system than through the civil system controlled by DHS.
Furthermore, individuals with family members in the United States are more

26. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (2012); see also John Clark & D. Alan Henry, The Pretrial
Release Decision, 81 JUDICATURE 76, 77 n.4 (1997) (noting that danger to the community became a
standard feature of criminal pretrial detention processes beginning in 1970 in Washington, D.C.).
27. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896).
28. See Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, supra note 19, at 48.
29. See CITY BAR JUSTICE CTR., NYC KNOW YOUR RIGHTS PROJECT: AN INNOVATIVE PRO
BONO RESPONSE TO THE LACK OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT IMMIGRANT DETAINEES 8 (2009) (noting
that 85 percent of detainees interviewed at the Varick Federal Detention Center in New York City had
been in the United States for more than five years); How Often is the Aggravated Felony Statute
Used?, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports
/158 (last visited Aug. 20, 2015) (explaining that people placed in removal proceedings on the basis of
an alleged aggravated felony conviction have been in the United States for fifteen years on average).
30. See, e.g., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, FAIR TREATMENT FOR THE INDIGENT: THE
MANHATTAN BAIL PROJECT: TEN-YEAR REPORT, 1961–1971 (1972), as reprinted in MARK L.
MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION 98–104
(4th ed. 2011); MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., A DECADE OF BAIL
RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (2012) (“The Manhattan Bail Project showed that defendants with
strong ties to the community would usually return to court without bail . . . .”).
31. SCHRIRO, supra note 5, at 6.
32. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 524–25 (2003).
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likely to return after removal,33 suggesting that many migrants have a strong
desire to remain in locations where they are well-known and easily identifiable.
Even those individuals incarcerated for immigration crimes are not
especially worthwhile candidates for detention. Neither illegal entry nor illegal
reentry, the two most commonly prosecuted immigration crimes, represents a
threat to the public.34 Nor does punishment for engaging in this conduct appear
to have a deterrent effect.35 Counterintuitively, empirical data suggest that
harsher immigration law enforcement measures do little to stop people from
coming to the United States and “may even have increased the likelihood of
continuing undocumented migration among experienced migrants.”36 This is
not surprising, given that many unauthorized migrants venture to the United
States to unite with family, to search for opportunities they cannot find in their
home country, or to escape violence.
In addition, immigration imprisonment fails to promote the goals of
immigration law when it captures people who are undeniably outside its reach:
U.S. citizens.37 Though it is difficult to know precisely how many U.S. citizens
have been incarcerated due to suspicion of violating an immigration law
provision, what little empirical research has been done, supported by anecdotal
information gleaned from judicial decisions, indicates that this is not an
isolated occurrence.38 Luis Fernando Juárez, for example, received concurrent
sentences of thirty-six and forty-two months on two immigration crimes—
illegal reentry and lying about being a U.S. citizen on an application to
purchase a firearm—to which it was later discovered he had an absolute
defense: he is a U.S. citizen.39 James Azia Makowski, who was born in India
and became a United States citizen as a one-year-old, was convicted of a low-

33. MARK GRIMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR BORDER SEC. & IMMIGRATION, REASONS AND
RESOLVE TO CROSS THE LINE: A POST-APPREHENSION SURVEY OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS
ALONG THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 2 tbl.1 (2013) (reporting that migrants previously removed who
had family members of any type in the United States were two to three times more likely than those
without family members to attempt to return); see also Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes & Cynthia Bansak,
U.S. Border Control: Counterpoint, in DEBATES ON U.S. IMMIGRATION 153, 159 (Judith Gans et al.
eds., 2012) (suggesting family ties increase migrants’ will to cross the border).
34. See INA §§ 275–276, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325–1326 (2012).
35. See Emily Ryo, Deciding To Cross: Norms and Economics of Unauthorized Migration, 78
AM. SOC. REV. 574, 587 (2013).
36. Douglas S. Massey, How Arizona Became Ground Zero in the War on Immigrants, in
STRANGE NEIGHBORS: THE ROLE OF STATES IN IMMIGRATION POLICY 40, 52 (Carissa Byrne Hessick
& Gabriel J. Chin eds., 2014); see also Douglas S. Massey & Fernando Riosmena, Undocumented
Migration From Latin America in an Era of Rising U.S. Enforcement, 630 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 294, 317 (2010).
37. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 56, http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/PDFs/OIG_APP_FY13.pdf.
38. See, e.g., Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S.
Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606, 608 (2011) (claiming that as many as “4,000 U.S.
citizens were detained or deported” in 2010, and more than 20,000 from 2003 to 2010).
39. United States v. Juarez, 672 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 2012).
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level federal drug offense and sentenced to a seven-year prison term.40 Instead
of going to a boot camp, he was sent to a maximum-security federal prison
because DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) unit thought he
was not a U.S. citizen, and lack of citizenship would have made him ineligible
for the boot camp.41 Examples, such as these, of U.S. citizens caught up in the
immigration imprisonment network abound. Indeed, data obtained from ICE
indicate that the Agency issued an immigration detainer—a request that a
person detained by a law enforcement agency remain in detention for as many
as five days to allow ICE time to decide whether to take custody—on at least
834 U.S. citizens from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2012.42 It is not clear how
many of these were actually taken into ICE custody, but, like Makowski,
undoubtedly some were.
Apart from the impact of a migrant’s forcible removal, immigration
imprisonment also disrupts countless communities. Migrants frequently
participate in all manner of community affairs, from working, to political
organizing, to attending religious services.43 Detention necessarily removes
them from these activities.44 Detention also makes obtaining representation
much more difficult. Since immigration law is simply too complicated for most
migrants to adequately represent themselves in court, representation has a
strong positive correlation with a migrant’s likelihood of avoiding removal.45
Relatedly, a study of cases in San Francisco Immigration Court found that
represented detainees were much more likely to ultimately avoid removal than
unrepresented detainees.46

40. Makowski v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 3d 901, 907–08 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
41. Id. at 908. At sentencing, Makowski believed that he would be sent to a boot camp for 120
days in lieu of serving the seven-year term of imprisonment. Id. ICE believed he was not a U.S. citizen
because neither it nor its predecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, had updated
Makowski’s file in the more-than-two-decades since he had become a United States citizen. Id.
42. ICE Detainers Placed on U.S. Citizens and Legal Permanent Residents, TRANSACTIONAL
RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 20, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/311.
43. See ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAULT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT
66 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that migrants participate in the labor force at roughly the national average,
though migrants from Latin America, Africa, and Asia participate at higher rates); id. at 139
(describing migrant participation in political activity); Frank Van Tubergen, Religious Affiliation and
Attendance Among Immigrants in Eight Western Countries: Individual and Contextual Effects, 45 J.
FOR SCI. STUD. RELIGION 1, 11 tbl.5 (2006) (finding that 35 percent of immigrants to the United States
reported attending religious services at least once per week).
44. See TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 74 (2007) (contending that confinement “disrupts social
networks and diminishes community stability”).
45. See Representation Is Key in Immigration Proceedings Involving Women with Children,
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 18, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration
/reports/377.
46. See N. CAL. COLLABORATIVE FOR IMMIGRANT JUSTICE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR
IMMIGRANT FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES: STUDY OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF DETAINED
IMMIGRANTS IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA 18 (2014).
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More perniciously, detention severely impacts migrants’ families. In
2009, almost seventeen million children had at least one parent who was not a
U.S. citizen, and roughly 5.1 million children, including four million U.S.
citizens, had at least one parent who lacked authorization to be in the United
States.47 It is not clear how many children living in the United States have had
a parent detained,48 but the DHS Inspector General found that 108,434 parents
of U.S.-citizen children were deported between fiscal years 1998 and 2007.49
Presumably, most of these parents saw the inside of an immigration prison at
some point. In some instances, parents suffering domestic violence have been
detained, leaving their children with an abusive partner.50 All of these effects
are felt even if a migrant ultimately avoids removal, an outcome that is
increasingly tenable for migrants with strong ties to the United States, as DHS
has taken steps to deprioritize detention and removal of such individuals.51
Detention sometimes plays an even more disruptive role in family life
when a single parent or both parents are confined. According to one advocacy
group, in 2011, at least 5,100 children lived in foster care because their parents
had been detained or deported.52 A child’s placement in foster care presents its
own challenge when parents are detained. To be reunited with a child, a parent
usually must comply with a reunification plan.53 These plans often include
requirements, such as regular phone calls and contact visits that detention
makes impossible, or at best very difficult.54 Many parents, therefore, lose
47. See Jeanne Batalova & Aaron Terrazas, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants
and Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.migration
policy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states.
48. Nina Rabin, Disappearing Parents: Immigration Enforcement and the Child Welfare
System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 99, 114 (2011) (explaining that much of the reason for the lack of
information about the number of children with detained parents arises from the fact that “[t]he child
welfare system does not systematically collect this information,” and noting that “ICE does not release
information about the number of parents who are detained”).
49. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-09-15, REMOVALS
INVOLVING ILLEGAL ALIEN PARENTS OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN CHILDREN 5 (2009).
50. KAVITHA SREEHARSHA, REFORMING AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION LAWS: A WOMAN’S
STRUGGLE 11 (2010).
51. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to
Field Office Dirs. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 4–5
(June 17, 2011) [hereinafter June 17 Morton Memo], http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf (listing a large number of factors that ICE weighs
in favor of exercising its prosecutorial discretion regarding removal proceedings).
52. APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., SHATTERED FAMILIES: THE PERILOUS INTERSECTION OF
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 22 (2011).
53. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, TORN APART BY IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:
PARENTAL RIGHTS AND IMMIGRATION DETENTION 2 (2010).
54. Id. at 2; Anita Ortiz Maddali, The Immigrant “Other”: Racialized Identity and the
Devaluation of Immigrant Family Relations, 89 IND. L.J. 643, 690 (2014). In 2013, DHS adopted a
policy intended to ameliorate the impact that immigration law enforcement, including detention, has
on parental custody rights. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
DIRECTIVE 11064.1, FACILITATING PARENTAL INTERESTS IN THE COURSE OF CIVIL IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/parental
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custody of their children after being imprisoned.55 As with migrants with strong
ties to the United States, ICE favorably considers that a migrant has or will
soon have children. Thus, a detained migrant parent could ultimately avoid
removal.56
In addition to detrimental social effects, immigration imprisonment
imposes a significant financial cost on government entities. Congress allocated
$2.8 billion to civil immigration detention and removal operations in the fiscal
year 2014 budget alone.57 In fiscal year 2015, USMS requested $1.5 billion to
house, transport, and care for pretrial federal detainees, almost half of whom it
expects will be detained because of an immigration charge.58 For its part, the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) requested $6.9 billion for salaries and
expenses associated with inmate care and confinement.59 In recent years,
roughly 11 to 12 percent of BOP inmates were convicted of an immigration
crime.60
While these dollar amounts are impressive by themselves, a better
measure of their value comes only by considering the threat the people
incarcerated pose and the ability to regulate that risk through alternative means.
The vast majority of detained migrants are unlikely to endanger the public if
released. At most, roughly 11 percent of detainees in civil immigration
detention can be said to be dangerous.61 Nothing about the commission of the
leading federal immigration crimes—illegal entry and illegal reentry—suggests
dangerousness, since these crimes consist of traveling to the United States
without the government’s permission.62 Despite their nonviolent nature, both
carry potentially substantial sentences: up to two years imprisonment for a
repeat illegal entry conviction and as much as twenty years for unauthorized
reentry.63

_interest_directive_signed.pdf. Among other requirements, the policy instructs ICE to “arrange for the
detained alien parent or legal guardian’s in-person appearance at family court or child welfare
proceedings, if practicable.” Id. § 5.4.
55. See, e.g., Adoption of C.M. v. E.M.B.R., 414 S.W.3d 622 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (recounting
one migrant’s termination of parental rights after an arrest in an immigration raid at her workplace).
56. June 17 Morton Memo, supra note 51, at 4–5.
57. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. F, tit. II, 128 Stat. 5,
251.
58. U.S. MARSHALS SERV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2015 PERFORMANCE BUDGET:
PRESIDENT’S BUDGET SUBMISSION: FEDERAL PRISONER DETENTION APPROPRIATION 7–9 (2014)
[hereinafter USMS, FY 2015 BUDGET].
59. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2015 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE
4 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2015summary/pdf/bop.pdf.
60. See CARSON & GOLINELLI, supra note 8, at 43 app. tbl.11.
61. See SCHRIRO, supra note 5, at 2.
62. See INA §§ 275(a), 276(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a), 1326(a) (2012). For a summary of other
federal immigration crimes, see García Hernández, supra note 19, at 1471–72.
63. INA §§ 275(a), 276(b)(2).
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Moreover, government agencies have plenty of other tools at their
disposal to limit the risk of migrants absconding.64 Penal and civil immigration
law enforcement authorities regularly release detainees from confinement,
sometimes under supervised release conditions and at other times without
imposing even that level of oversight.65 Though no studies track the appearance
rates of people released from pretrial penal confinement while awaiting
prosecution for an immigration crime, several studies indicate that appearance
rates are quite high for participants in alternatives to civil immigration
detention. ICE reported a 93.8 percent appearance rate for its alternative to
detention (ATD) programs in fiscal year 2010.66 This exceeds the greater-than80-percent court appearance rate achieved by an intensive pilot program that
the Vera Institute of Justice operated in the late 1990s at the request of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).67
In addition to increased appearance rates, ATD programs have the added
benefit of operating at a fraction of the cost of detention. ICE reports that each
detention bed costs $119 per day, but the Government Accountability Office
reports that the true figure is $158, including personnel costs.68 Meanwhile,
ICE currently funds one ATD program called the Intensive Supervision
Assistance Program (ISAP) II, operated by a subsidiary of the private prison
corporation GEO Group.69 It has a capacity of approximately 22,000 people per
day.70 In fiscal year 2013, ISAP II cost ICE as little as $0.30 per day for
technological supervision and as much as $8.49 per day for more intensive inperson supervision. Its cost per participant averaged $4.73 per day.71 Despite
the success of ATD programs, however, the federal government continues to
64. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)–(c) (2012) (describing alternatives to federal pretrial
criminal detention); Sampson & Mitchell, supra note 4, at 105 (discussing the alternatives to civil
immigration detention used in multiple countries).
65. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Salaries
and Expenses, collected in CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FY 2015, at 62 (2014)
[hereinafter ICE FY 2015 Budget Justification], http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications
/DHS-Congressional-Budget-Justification-FY2015.pdf (describing the release options available for
people in civil immigration proceedings).
66. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Salaries
and Expenses, collected in CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FY 2012, at 44 (2011)
[hereinafter ICE FY 2012 Budget Justification], http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-congressionalbudget-justification-fy2012.pdf.
67. MEGAN GOLDEN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM: ATTAINING COMPLIANCE WITH IMMIGRATION LAWS THROUGH COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION 14–15 (1998).
68. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 15-26, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION:
IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSES NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS PROGRAM
EFFECTIVENESS 19 n.47 (2014); ICE FY 2015 Budget Justification, supra note 65, at 40.
69. ICE FY 2012 Budget Justification, supra note 66, at 44; see also LUTHERAN
IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE SERV., ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION (ATD): HISTORY AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2013), http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/LIRS-Backgrounder-onAlternatives-to-Detention-12-6-13.pdf.
70. ICE FY 2015 Budget Justification, supra note 65, at 60.
71. Id. at 62.
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emphasize detention. President Barack Obama’s fiscal year 2015 budget
request, for example, asked for $2.6 billion for all detention and removal
operations, of which $1.8 billion would go to custody costs and $94 million to
ATD costs.72
Such an emphasis on detention is neither surprising nor wise. Applying
“the minimum degree of control sufficient to ensure security,” argues
sociologist Charles H. Logan, promotes “[t]he causes of justice, order,
economy, and inmate welfare.”73 A proponent of private prisons, Logan
nonetheless bemoans that prison officials often use more stringent security
measures than needed for no better reason than because those resources are
available and because over-securitization “decreases political costs by
minimizing the risk of escapes or loss of control.”74
With such high appearance rates and low costs compared to detention, the
federal government’s continued primary reliance on detention is unjustifiable.
Add to this the harsh impact that immigration imprisonment metes out on
communities, families, and individuals needlessly detained—sometimes
unlawfully, as in the case of U.S. citizens—and the result is clear: immigration
imprisonment is a harsh, expensive tactic used excessively in the face of less
severe, less expensive, and more effective alternatives.
B. Law Suffers
Aside from being poor policy, immigration imprisonment also threatens
the legitimacy of the immigration law system as a whole. Legitimacy depends
on the fairness of the procedures used to enforce the law.75 People obey the law
when they perceive the authority that enforces it as legitimate and when
compliance comports with their sense of morality.76 Morality plays an
important role in compliance77—people are less likely to obey a law that they
view as morally illegitimate.78 Heavy-handed use of immigration imprisonment
affects how migrants and their communities view the procedural fairness and
morality of immigration law enforcement. This, in turn, undermines the
legitimacy of the system.
Furthermore, immigration imprisonment falls most heavily on people of
color, especially migrants from Mexico and other Latin American countries. In

72. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Total Budget Authority, in ICE FY 2015 Budget
Justification, supra note 65, at 5.
73. CHARLES. H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS 71 (1990).
74. Id.
75. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 63 (Princeton U. Press 2006) (1990).
76. See id. at 25. Other reasons why people obey laws include an individual’s cost-benefit
analysis of compliance and opportunity structures for noncompliance. See Emily Ryo, Through the
Back Door: Applying Theories of Legal Compliance to Illegal Immigration During the Chinese
Exclusion Era, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 109, 113–14 (2006).
77. See Ryo, supra note 76, at 127.
78. See id.
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fiscal year 2012, for example, at least 92.7 percent of civil immigration
detainees emigrated from Latin America, including 64.4 percent from Mexico
alone.79 Though comparable figures for the penal immigration population are
unavailable, the federal government reported that, of the 47,551 federal
prisoners in fiscal year 2010 who were not U.S. citizens, 33,600 were Mexican
citizens, and another 6,002 were citizens of countries located in Central or
South America.80
Such racially skewed enforcement may lead to the perception that
immigration law enforcement targets people of color generally and Latinos
specifically. This can lead to a delegitimation of immigration law enforcement
in the eyes of Latino migrants, their friends, and their families.81 Law
enforcement processes perceived as racially skewed threaten to delegitimize
immigration law. If migrants come to think that legal proceedings are stacked
against them, they are less likely to abide by the rules of the proceedings.82
This is an obviously undesirable outcome.
Moreover, immigration imprisonment’s broad reach means that many
people may view it as indiscriminate. Given that only a small percentage of
people incarcerated for immigration law violations have committed a violent
act,83 sympathetic commentators frequently claim that migrants have done
nothing worthy of detention. Indeed, a common refrain among immigrants’
rights advocates is that migrants are not criminals and thus should not be
treated as such.84 Former Florida Governor Jeb Bush illustrated a variation of
this framing recently, commenting that unauthorized migrants “crossed the
border because they had no other means to work to be able to provide for their

79. See SIMANSKI & SAPP, supra note 10, at 5 tbl.5. DHS enumerates specific detention data
for the ten most common countries of origin only. Id. Together, citizens of these countries comprise
93.6 percent of the fiscal year 2012 detained population. Of these, all but Jamaica (0.5 percent of the
total detained population) and China (0.4 percent of the total detained population) are in Latin
America. See id.
80. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 239913, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,
2010, at 24 tbl.14 (2013).
81. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL
RIGHTS 38 (2004); Ryo, supra note 35, at 593.
82. See Das, supra note 19, at 154 (“People who are eligible for relief from removal have a
stronger incentive to appear in immigration court to resolve their cases.”).
83. See SCHRIRO, supra note 5, at 2.
84. See, e.g., Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, Immigration Reform and
Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101, 104 (2013) (“When citizenship is assessed with an ever-narrowing view
of worthiness, many are left outside its frame.”); Jodie M. Lawston & Ruben R. Murillo, Policing Our
Border, Policing Our Nation: An Examination of the Ideological Connections Between Border
Vigilantism and U.S. National Ideology, in BEYOND WALLS AND CAGES: PRISONS, BORDERS, AND
GLOBAL CRISIS 181, 183 (Jenna M. Loyd et al. eds., 2012) (noting the discursive criminalization of
immigrants, since “immigration law falls under administrative law, not criminal law”). To be sure,
some advocates—especially those among the more radical leftists—reject the discourse of criminality
entirely. See Borderlands Autonomist Collective, Resisting the Security-Industrial Complex:
Operation Streamline and the Militarization of the Arizona-Mexico Borderlands, in BEYOND WALLS
AND CAGES, supra, at 193.
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family—yes, they broke the law, but it’s not a felony . . . —it’s an act of
love.”85 A law enforcement regime that is perceived as punishing good-hearted
people who seek only to provide for their families risks losing moral
credibility.86
Finally, detention adversely affects rule-of-law norms. Since detention
severely impacts a migrant’s ability to access counsel, it is impossible to know
whether pro se migrants are removed because the law mandated that outcome
or simply because no one was available to make the migrant’s case. Detention,
therefore, indirectly diminishes the legitimacy of the outcome.
II.
IMMIGRATION PRISONERS
Despite the harms outlined above, immigration imprisonment is
ubiquitous. Federal, state, and local government actors annually identify and
detain more than five hundred thousand people allegedly involved in prohibited
migration activity. These are the nation’s immigration prisoners—those most
directly affected by the harms of imprisonment and the widespread use of
incarceration to enforce immigration law. Though they may be confined by
various actors—be they federal, state, or local authorities—the commonality
among their experiences counsels for treating this as a single phenomenon. All
of these individuals are incarcerated because of migration-related activity. They
would not be detained but for the act of crossing the border or various actions
necessary to survive. It is that activity that makes them susceptible to this type
of confinement. In addition, while some immigration imprisonment is labeled
civil and some criminal, the conditions of confinement in secure facilities are
essentially identical. This Part identifies the immigration-related conduct that
federal and state legislatures have deemed worthy of confinement, and explains
how often confinement happens.
A. Federal Civil Immigration Prisoners
It is no surprise that the federal government regulates immigration
through what we think of as our “immigration laws,” that is, the set of laws that
determine who may be in the country. Yet, it is much less commonly
understood that this civil system, in which no person is ever accused or
convicted of a crime, also results in a vast network of immigration
imprisonment. In reality, the federal government uses its extraordinary
administrative powers to regulate migrants’ conduct by confining them. Indeed,

85. Peter Moskowitz, Jeb Bush Calls Illegal Immigration ‘An Act of Love,’ Riles
Conservatives, AL JAZEERA AM. (Apr. 6, 2014, 5:12 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles
/2014/4/6/jeb-bush-calls-crossingtheborderanactofloverilesconservatives.html.
86. Cf. Ryo, supra note 35, at 594.
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as Figure 1 illustrates, the number of people confined has steadily grown in
recent decades.87
FIGURE 1
CIVIL IMMIGRATION DETENTION POPULATION
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At the root of civil immigration detention is a single statutory provision,
INA section 236, which provides two means through which DHS may detain
migrants. One path obligates DHS to detain individuals who meet specified
criteria, while the other provides a discretionary route.
Under INA section 236(c), DHS “shall take into custody” all migrants
whom immigration officials have “reason to believe” are inadmissible or
deportable on the bases enumerated in the statute, including almost all of the
crime-based removal categories.88 An individual convicted of a qualifying
crime—ranging from offenses as minor as shoplifting to crimes as serious as
murder—must be taken into DHS custody. That individual must be kept and
remain in custody pending resolution of the immigration court process, until an
immigration judge determines whether the individual may stay in the country.89

87. I have selected these dates to provide a consistent comparison to the post-conviction data
reported in Figure 2. Data for other years are available and similarly show a growing population.
88. Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 660, 662, 668 (B.I.A. 1999); see also INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) (2012); Diop v. ICE, 656 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2011).
89. Shoplifting and murder are both aggravated felonies, thus both fall within INA § 236(c).
See INA § 101(a)(43)(G) (defining a theft offense with a term of imprisonment of at least one year as
an aggravated felony); id. § 101(a)(43)(A) (defining murder as an aggravated felony); id.
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) (providing that a migrant convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable); id.
§ 236(c)(1)(B) (providing that a person reasonably believed to be deportable pursuant to
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) is subject to mandatory custody). Whether or not a specific state statute punishing
shoplifting or murder constitutes a theft or murder offense, respectively, as defined for immigration
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This mandatory-detention provision covers persons whom ICE agents
reasonably believe are removable for having been convicted of a controlled
substance offense—a category that, as the Supreme Court has put it, includes
“virtually every drug offense except for only the most insignificant marijuana
offenses.”90 This category also includes anyone convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude and sentenced to at least one year in prison—qualifying crimes
include animal fighting and indecent exposure.91
Though the mandatory custody statute is quite broad, only a small
percentage of migrants detained by DHS fall within its reach. According to a
study analyzing immigration court and DHS data, “at least three out of every
five individuals detained by ICE who are put into removal proceedings could
have been released.”92 A second study found that, according to ICE’s own
records, “only 9 [percent] of individuals are considered subject to mandatory
detention.”93 Under both studies, the conclusion is unmistakable: while many
detained people fall within the mandatory custody provision, the vast majority
do not.
As these numbers imply, migrants who are not caught in INA section
236(c)’s wide net are nonetheless detainable. Front-line immigration agents
have remarkable authority to detain or release on bond anyone potentially
subject to removal, even if section 236(c) does not apply.94 One statutory
section, for example, provides that “an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United
States.”95 Another grants immigration officers broad warrantless arrest powers
law purposes, however, depends on the language of the state offense and, for theft offenses, the
sentence imposed.
90. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 n.1 (2010); INA § 236(c)(1)(B) (referencing INA
section 237(a)(2)(B), which provides that a person convicted of a controlled substance offense, “other
than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is
deportable”).
91. INA § 236(c)(1)(C) (providing that a migrant reasonably believed to be deportable under
INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least one year is subject to
mandatory custody); id. § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) (stating that a migrant convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude is deportable).
92. Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing Justice:
The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 374
(2011) (emphasis omitted). For an explanation of the study’s data and methodology, see id. at 408–09.
93. NYU SCHOOL OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC ET AL., INSECURE COMMUNITIES,
DEVASTATED FAMILIES: NEW DATA ON IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND DEPORTATION PRACTICES
IN NEW YORK CITY 10 (2012) [hereinafter INSECURE COMMUNITIES] (emphasis omitted). This report
analyzed data obtained from ICE of all individuals apprehended by ICE’s New York City field office
from October 2005 through December 2010. These individuals either received or requested a hearing
but were not granted a hearing before an immigration judge. Id. at 1. Interestingly, this report and the
New York Immigrant Representation Study Report differ dramatically from Schriro’s analysis of a
narrower data set—the civil detainee population on September 1, 2009. SCHRIRO, supra note 5, at 6.
Unlike these reports, Schriro found that “[o]f the aliens in detention on September 1, 66 percent were
subject to mandatory detention.” Id. at 2.
94. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2015).
95. INA § 236(a).
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if an officer has reason to believe that a person is in the United States in
violation of immigration law “and is likely to escape before a warrant can be
obtained.”96 Detained migrants can then seek “redetermination” of the frontline officer’s decision to detain by petitioning an immigration judge for bond.97
Unlike the mandatory custody provision’s specific directives, INA section
236(a) grants immigration judges wide latitude to make discretionary
determinations about which migrants to detain, pending removal proceedings.
In deciding whether to grant a bond, immigration judges typically focus on
whether a migrant is a flight risk or a danger to the community.98 If the
immigration judge concludes that the migrant poses one of these threats, then
continued detention is legally appropriate. Importantly, immigration judges
“ha[ve] broad discretion in deciding the factors that [they] may consider” to
determine whether a migrant is a flight or public safety risk.99
For example, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has upheld an
immigration judge’s denial of bond when the immigration judge relied on facts
and charges in a criminal complaint to which the migrant had pleaded not
guilty, which the criminal court had found to merit a bond from criminal
incarceration, and which had not yet resulted in a conviction.100 Attorney
General John Ashcroft upheld denial even when there was no indication that
the detained migrant had been involved in criminal activity. In D-J-, the
Attorney General found that it was permissible to detain an individual merely
for arriving in the United States without authorization as part of a group of over
two hundred Haitians on board an overloaded boat, some of whom had tried to
evade the U.S. Coast Guard.101
Ashcroft’s decision in D-J- marked an important departure from the
traditional inquiry regarding flight risk and public safety threat. A migrant may
be detained pending civil immigration proceedings, he announced, if she poses
a national security risk or her confinement would deter others from coming to
the United States. The latter was a particularly striking justification, since it is a
frequent reason given to impose criminal imprisonment, but not one that
appears in civil detention norms. For a decade after its 2003 announcement,
immigration judges used D-J- infrequently. However, during the summer of
2014, it played an important role in the federal government’s decision to detain
children and mothers who began appearing in unusually large numbers. A
federal court eventually stopped the government from using these criteria in
this context.102

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. § 287(a)(2).
8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1).
See Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (B.I.A. 2006).
Id. at 40.
See id. at 38–39.
See D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 577–79 (Att’y Gen. 2003).
R.I.L-R v. Johnson, No. 15-11 (JEB), 2015 WL 737117 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2015).
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Unlike the penal context, there is no presumption that a migrant in civil
immigration proceedings will be released.103 Rather, the migrant carries the
burden of showing that he is not likely to abscond and does not present a risk of
endangering the community.104 Migrants have a difficult time meeting this
burden because they do not have a right to appointed counsel. Consequently, 44
percent of all migrants in removal proceedings, and an astonishing 84 percent
of detained migrants in those proceedings, lack representation.105 Even those
who do obtain counsel frequently do so well after an ICE official has decided
they merit detention. Obtaining bond is therefore a steep hurdle for migrants to
overcome.
If the immigration judge concludes that a migrant does not pose a flight or
safety threat, then the immigration judge should grant a bond. Actual release,
however, is not guaranteed. The INA requires that any bond issued be at least
$1,500, and, unlike many criminal-law contexts, an immigration court bond
must be paid in full. This is no small amount for migrants, especially given
that, because of their incarceration, those who do receive bond have not had
meaningful employment while detained. Even those who work inside the
facility frequently earn as little as $1.00 per day for up to forty hours of work
per week.106
Moreover, when they do grant a bond, immigration judges frequently
impose much higher amounts than the statutory minimum. A study of bond
orders issued by New York immigration judges revealed that “[o]ver 75
[percent] of all bond settings are $5,000 or more” and “35 [percent] of all
bonds are $10,000 and above.”107 A migrant’s resources matter little in setting
a bond amount. Indeed, an official guide for immigration judges advises that a
migrant’s “[a]bility to pay is not dispositive” in setting a bond amount and is a
“less significant factor” than whether the migrant has a fixed address, lawful
immigration status in the United States, family ties, a criminal record, or other
factors deemed “significant.”108 With such high bond amounts and such little
consideration of a migrant’s financial resources, it is not surprising that the

103.
104.
105.

See D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 575, 581.
Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40; see also D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 581.
OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012:
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK G1 fig.9 (2013); NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING
EFFICIENCY AND PROMOTING JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 1 (2008).
106. See Varick Fed. Detention Facility, Detainee Handbook 10 (Jan. 11, 2010),
http://www.governmentillegals.org/2011FOIA13921SlaveLabor.pdf (unpublished internal facility
document describing the “Detainee Volunteer Work Program”). Employment of detained migrants is
authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1555 (2012).
107. INSECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 93, at 11.
108. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION JUDGE
BENCHBOOK §§ I.H., I.I.2. (n.d.), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/tools/Bond_Guide.pdf.
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New York bond study found that “55 [percent] of those who receive bond are
unable to pay it.”109 Those individuals consequently remain detained.
B. Federal Criminal Immigration Prisoners
In addition to its expansive civil immigration powers, the federal
government readily uses its criminal policing authority to imprison large
numbers of migrants. The USMS is the federal policing agency responsible for
pretrial custody of individuals suspected of all types of federal crimes, and a
large portion of those within its custody are suspected of having committed a
federal crime related to immigration activity.110 These crimes include illegal
entry, a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months imprisonment for a first
offense, and illegal reentry into the United States, a felony punishable by as
many as twenty years imprisonment.111 The USMS expects to book 105,164
individuals for immigration crimes in fiscal year 2015 alone, just shy of half
the 220,599 total people the Agency expects to take into custody that year, and
almost double the 54,621 pretrial immigration detainees held in the 2007 fiscal
year.112 Federal prosecutors in U.S. Attorneys’ Offices then prosecute the
detained individuals. In fiscal year 2010, U.S. Attorneys concluded 85,545
cases in which an immigration crime was the lead charge against the
defendant.113 These cases made up a remarkable 44.6 percent of total cases
concluded by federal prosecutors that year, up from 25.9 percent four years
earlier.114 By fiscal year 2012, a remarkable 48 percent of all cases concluded
were for immigration crimes.115
Upon conviction, most of these individuals were ordered into the custody
of the BOP, the federal agency charged with maintaining custody of federal
prisoners convicted of crimes. Given the growing number of immigration crime
prosecutions, it is not surprising that the number of convicted offenders
imprisoned in the federal prison system also grew, though relatively short
prison sentences mean that they represent a lesser portion of the total convicted
offender prison population. The percentage of immigration crime offenders in
BOP’s custody rose from 10 percent in 2002 to 12 percent in 2010.116 Figure 2

109. INSECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 93, at 11. Accounts of civil immigration detention in
the 1980s suggest that migrants have long had difficulty meeting bond amounts. ROBERT S. KAHN,
OTHER PEOPLE’S BLOOD: U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS IN THE REAGAN DECADE 72 (1996).
110. See MOTIVANS, supra note 6, at 3 tbl.2.
111. INA §§ 275(a), 276(a), (b)(2), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a), 1326(a), (b)(2) (2012).
112. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 230889, FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2007—STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.1.1 (2010); USMS, FY 2015 BUDGET,
supra note 55, at 7, 8.
113. MOTIVANS, supra note 80, at 12 tbl.6.
114. See id.
115. MOTIVANS, supra note 6, at 12 tbl.6.
116. MOTIVANS, supra note 80, at 23 (stating that 12 percent of federal prisoners in 2010
were immigration offenders); see id. at 22 tbl.13 (noting that 82.4 percent of people convicted of
an immigration crime in FY 2010 and 91 percent convicted in 2006 were sentenced to prison);
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shows that this growth is indicative of a much longer pattern of increased postconviction imprisonment.117
FIGURE 2
POST-CONVICTION IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN FEDERAL PRISON
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C. State Immigration Prisoners
Following the federal government’s model, some states—most notably
Arizona—have also made frequent use of their criminal authority in ways that
implicate immigration imprisonment. They have done this by creating
substantive criminal laws and regulating criminal procedure.
Arizona’s experiment with human smuggling illustrates states’ reliance on
substantive criminal lawmaking authority. In 2005, that State’s legislature
criminalized “intentionally engag[ing] in the smuggling of human beings for
MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 238581, IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE
FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2010, at 34 tbl.13 (2012, rev. 2013) (stating that there were 15,711
immigration offenders in BOP custody in 2002); PAIGE M. HARRISON & JENNIFER C. KARBERG,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 198877, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2002, at 1 (stating
there were 161,681 prisoners in BOP custody in 2002).
117. MOTIVANS, NCJ 238581, supra note 116 (stating that the number of post-conviction
immigration offenders in federal custody was 15,711 in 2002 and 21,917 in 2010); JOHN SCALIA
& MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 191745, IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2000, at 5 (2002) (stating that the number of postconviction immigration offenders in federal prison was 1,593 in 1985 and 13,676 in 2000).
Unfortunately, consistently tabulated data for other years are not publicly available.
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profit or commercial purpose.”118 Without question, the law was meant to
sanction people who are paid to clandestinely bring migrants into Arizona.
Even before this new anti-smuggling law went into effect, however,
prosecutors in Maricopa County were creatively retooling it to target the
migrants smuggled, as well.119 The Maricopa County Attorney and Sheriff each
created units within their offices to target this brand of human smuggling that
equated the people who pay to be snuck into the United States with those who
are paid. Within a few months, “hundreds of migrants were arrested in
Maricopa County for smuggling themselves.”120
One early victory for this innovative self-smuggling strategy, for example,
involved a man who had been riding under a piece of carpet in the bed of a
pickup truck.121 Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office deputies chased the truck at
speeds in excess of one hundred miles per hour after noticing that it had a
malfunctioning brake light. Though the driver was never caught, this migrant
was arrested and convicted of conspiring to smuggle himself.122 The law’s
implementation criminalized certain behavior related to migration itself and, as
such, resulted in the prosecution and conviction of migrants for offenses for
which they were then subject to state incarceration.
Separately, Arizona elected officials adopted a series of criminalprocedure reforms targeted at keeping migrants charged with crimes in jail
longer. First, the Arizona legislature enacted a statute requiring all state
detention facilities to determine the citizenship status of all arrestees.123 At the
same time, they mandated that state judges consider a person’s immigration
status when deciding whether to grant bail.124 Second, voters amended the State
Constitution to add a provision prohibiting judges from granting bail “[f]or
serious felony offenses . . . if the person charged has entered or remained in the
United States illegally.”125 The State legislature subsequently defined “serious
felony offense” for these purposes to include most state felonies.126 While the
underlying offenses in cases subject to these rules could be related to any type
of crime, the salient feature of these detention measures is the identity and
118. Act of Mar. 14, 2005, sec. 3, 47 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. ch. 2 (codified as
amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2319 (2015)).
119. Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1749, 1759 (2011). After legal challenges in state and federal courts spanning
several years, a federal district court held that federal immigration law preempts section 13-2319.
We Are Am. v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 297 F.R.D. 373, 392 (D. Ariz. 2013).
120. Eagly, supra note 119, at 1762.
121. See State v. Barragan-Sierra, 196 P.3d 879, 882–83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
122. See id.
123. Eagly, supra note 119, at 1762 (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3906 (2010)).
124. Id. (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967(B)(11)).
125. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22(4).
126. Act of June 28, 2006, sec. 3, 47 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2d Reg. Sess. ch. 380 (codified as
amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3961(A)(b) (2015)). Arizona recognizes six classes of
felonies, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-601(A), but only class 1 through class 4 felonies are
included in the “serious felony offense” definition. Id. § 13-3961(A)(b).
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immigration status of the criminal defendant, thus creating another form of
immigration imprisonment. These defendants, because of their status, are likely
to be detained when a similarly situated U.S. citizen defendant would not.
In a doubly harsh interaction of these two sets of laws, because human
smuggling, including self-smuggling, is a felony, “[u]ndocumented immigrants
charged with smuggling themselves could now be detained without any
possibility of bond.”127 After the Arizona Supreme Court ordered that
defendants potentially subject to the no-bail provision receive a hearing with
appointed counsel within twenty-four hours of their initial appearance in court,
the state legislature gave courts up to seven days to schedule a no-bail
hearing.128 Meanwhile, “Maricopa County made a policy decision that indigent
counsel could not be appointed until arraignment. As a result, defendants could
remain detained for up to two weeks before obtaining a full [no-bail] hearing
with counsel present.”129 After these changes, few migrants charged with
smuggling themselves into Arizona managed to get out of jail on bail.130 In this
case, the combination of the migration-related criminal activity and the migrant
identity of the defendant led to immigration imprisonment.
Not content with its unprecedented self-smuggling prosecutions leading to
nearly automatic detention and especially harsh bond requirements for migrants
accused of any crime, Arizona adopted other substantive crimes and criminal
procedure features intending to imprison unauthorized migrants. In 2005, the
legislature criminalized aggravated identity theft, punishable by up to seven
years imprisonment, and trafficking in identity documents, punishable by up to
ten years imprisonment.131 Both of these punishments target use of identifying
information not belonging to the accused regardless of whether the
identification information was fictitious or belonged to a real person. Two
years later, in 2007, the Arizona legislature authorized law enforcement
agencies to detain for up to seven days any witness who, “because of the
immigration status of the person,” may not be available to testify at a human
smuggling trial as a result of having been removed.132 A year later, the
legislature enacted a statute that allows judges to enhance a minimum or
maximum sentence if the defendant is found beyond a reasonable doubt to be,

127. Eagly, supra note 119, at 1763.
128. See id. at 1764–65.
129. Id. at 1765.
130. Id.
131. See Act of Apr. 25, 2005, sec. 3, 47 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. ch. 190 (codified
as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2009, -2010). Aggravated identity theft is a class 3
felony, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is seven years. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-702(d). Trafficking in identity documents is a class 2 felony, for which the maximum term of
imprisonment is ten years. Id.
132. Act of May 4, 2007, sec. 1, § 13-4085(A), (E), 48 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. ch.
178 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4085(A), (E)); see also Eagly, supra note 119, at
1766.
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or admits to being, in the United States without authorization.133 Again, these
provisions either directly criminalize—and punish through imprisonment—
migration-related activity on the state level or, alternatively, create mechanisms
that result in the detention of migrants as a consequence of their status or
migration-related conduct.
Arizona has undoubtedly taken the lead in states’ contemporary efforts to
use their criminal law and procedure to expand immigration imprisonment. It
has not, however, been alone. Oklahoma, for example, imposes a minimum of
one year of imprisonment for transporting, concealing, harboring, or sheltering
anyone known to be present in the United States in violation of immigration
law, or for doing so in reckless disregard of the fact that the person is present in
the United States in violation of immigration law.134 Florida135 and Missouri136
have similar statutes, both of which establish violations punishable by
imprisonment.
At least three other states—California, Oregon, and Wyoming—
“criminalize[] the use of false proof of citizenship or permanent residence
documents.”137 All three rely on imprisonment to sanction violations of these
offenses, though they differ in severity quite dramatically. Wyoming punishes
the intentional use of false documents to conceal citizenship or permanent
resident status by as little as six months,138 while California requires at least
five years imprisonment for doing much the same.139 Oregon imposes a
maximum term of five years imprisonment for using someone else’s citizenship
status or “alien identification number,” a unique number assigned to all
migrants who seek lawful immigration status.140 Yet another state, Colorado,
criminalizes human smuggling, but, unlike Arizona, appears not to apply this
statute to the smuggled migrants.141 Lastly, Missouri has a statutory no-bail
133. Act of July 7, 2008, sec. 23, § 13-701(D)(21), 48 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2d Reg. Sess. ch.
301 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(D)(21)) (referencing failure to comply with
INA §§ 273, 274, 275, 276, 278, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1323, 1324, 1325, 1326, 1328 (2012)); see also
Eagly, supra note 120, at 1766.
134. OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 21, § 466(A)–(B) (2015).
135. FLA. STAT. § 787.07 (2015) (classifying human smuggling as a third-degree felony);
id. § 775.082(3)(e) (authorizing up to a five-year prison term); id. § 775.084(4)(a)(3) (authorizing
as many as ten years imprisonment for habitual offenders).
136. MO. REV STAT.§ 577.675(1), (2) (2014) (imposing at least one year imprisonment in
the version of the statute effective through December 31, 2016, and classifying the crime as a
“Class D” felony, punishable by up to seven years imprisonment per MO. REV STAT.§ 558.011, in
the version effective January 2, 2017).
137. Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1599 (2008).
138. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-615(a) (2015).
139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 114 (West 2015).
140. OR. REV. STAT. § 165.800(2), (4)(b)(D) (2013) (defining terms related to identity
theft); id. § 161.605(3) (setting a maximum imprisonment sentence of five years for a Class C
felony).
141. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-13-128 (2014); see also People v. Fuentes-Espinoza, No.
08CA1231, 2013 WL 174439 (Colo. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2013) (upholding statute’s constitutionality
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provision,142 and a Texas legislator recently proposed a bill that would prevent
unauthorized migrants from participating in community supervision
programs.143 Immigration imprisonment is thus a feature not only of federal but
also of state criminal policing.
D. Federal-State Crossover Prisoners
In addition to federal and state reliance on their own lawmaking powers,
for many years migrants were imprisoned in large numbers through an
innovative type of intergovernmental cooperation. Until federal courts largely
curtailed the practice due to concerns about its encroachment on the Fourth
Amendment’s probable cause requirement, ICE made ready use of immigration
detainers (sometimes referred to as “immigration holds”).144 A detainer is a
request by ICE to a law enforcement agency holding a potentially removable
migrant already in its custody to postpone releasing the migrant for up to fortyeight hours after the criminal-law justification for the detention ends.145 In the
twenty-two months spanning October 2011 to August 2013, ICE issued
436,478 detainers.146
Stemming from the INA’s instruction that immigration officials target
migrants convicted of certain offenses for civil detention and removal,147
detainers blend administrative and criminal confinement into immigration
imprisonment. By design, detainers frequently extend immigration
imprisonment. Migrants subject to a detainer are confined during the fortyeight hour window that ICE requests.148 Sometimes judges view a detainer as a
sign that the person will abscond if given the opportunity.149 As a result, judges

against preemption challenge), cert. granted in part, No. 13SC128, 2014 WL 1190061 (Colo.
Mar. 24, 2014).
142. MO. REV. STAT. § 544.470 (2014).
143. S.B. 174, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
144. See Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United
States, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 634, 676 (2013); see also Complaint at 1, Roy v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, No. CV-12-9012-RGK (FFMx) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2012), http://legalactioncenter.org
/sites/default/files/Roy v. County of Los Angeles--Complaint.pdf (noting that “immigration
detainer” and “immigration hold” are often used interchangeably); Christopher N. Lasch,
Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers, 35 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 173–74 (2008) (describing detainers as central to CAP).
145. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2015); see also Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 642 (3d Cir.
2014).
146. Targeting of ICE Detainers Varies Widely by State and by Facility, TRANSACTIONAL
RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 11, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/343.
The report notes that it does not include data for February, April, or September 2013, during this
twenty-two month period. Id. Fifty percent of migrants had a conviction of some type on their
records, while the rest did not. Id.
147. See Lasch, Enforcing the Limits, supra note 144, at 183.
148. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (authorizing detention in the custody of jail or prison officials for
up to forty-eight hours to allow DHS to take the arrestee into civil immigration detention).
149. See State v. Fajardo-Santos, 973 A.2d 933, 940 (N.J. 2009) (“[T]he lodging of a
detainer marks a change in circumstances that can affect whether a defendant will fail to appear.
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deny bail or set it at an amount too high for migrants with a detainer to meet.150
At other times, arrestees subject to an immigration detainer remain imprisoned
even when a court has granted bail.151 Maria Miranda-Olivares, for example,
could not get out of jail because guards told her she would not be allowed to
leave even if she posted the bond amount set by a judge.152 Similarly, officials
at the Lehigh County Prison in Pennsylvania refused to release Ernesto Galarza
even after he posted bail, simply because ICE had issued a detainer against
him.153
Furthermore, at times, detainers work to exclude migrants from jail
diversion programs, into which migrants would otherwise stand a good chance
of admission.154 Diversion programs such as drug rehabilitation are frequently
credited with reducing recidivism and prison costs.155 In a review of
immigration detainers lodged against inmates at New York City’s Rikers Island
jail, however, the New York City Bar Association noted that, instead of leaving
jail to enter into a diversion program, “immigrants with detainers remain at
Rikers until the criminal case is adjudicated in the traditional manner, which, if
a sentence results or no bail is paid, may result in days or months of
incarceration before transfer to an immigration facility.”156
Any of these events effectively prolongs a migrant’s criminal
incarceration. A study of four years of detention data from Travis County,
Texas, which includes Austin, revealed that inmates subject to a detainer
remained imprisoned prior to trial almost three times longer than those without
a detainer—from sixty-five to seventy-six days for inmates with a detainer
compared to twenty-two to twenty-six days for those without.157 With some

Judges may therefore consider that development in deciding whether to modify bail.”). Though
Fajardo-Santos is, to date, the only State supreme court decision to address a detainer’s impact on
bail, advocates regularly claim that judges see detainers as an adverse factor in bail
determinations. See, e.g., IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., REVISED 2012 ICE DETAINER
GUIDANCE: WHO IT COVERS, WHO IT DOES NOT, AND THE PROBLEMS THAT REMAIN 6–7
(2012), http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/detainer_guidance_plus_addendums.pdf.
150. See AARTI SHAHANI, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, NEW YORK CITY ENFORCEMENT OF
IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 4 (2010) (noting that, of noncitizens held in
New York City jails on criminal charges, 35.8 percent of those without a detainer were released
on bail, while only 7 percent of those with a detainer were able to make bail).
151. Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at
*3–4 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); see also Complaint, Roy v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, supra note 144, at
1, 2, 3 (alleging that the Los Angeles County jail regularly denies migrants release after the fortyeight hour window expires and subjected 19,725 people to this practice in 2011 alone).
152. Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *4.
153. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2014).
154. See COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPERATIONS, N.Y.C. BAR, IMMIGRATION
DETAINERS NEED NOT BAR ACCESS TO JAIL DIVERSION PROGRAMS 3 (2009).
155. See Marsha Weissman, Aspiring to the Impracticable: Alternatives to Incarceration in
the Era of Mass Incarceration, 33 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235, 243–44 (2009).
156. COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPERATIONS, N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 154.
157. ANDREA GUTTIN, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., THE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM:
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 12 fig.5 (2010).
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variation, this trend holds true for all but the most minor misdemeanor
offenses.158 An analysis of detainees in New York came to a similar
conclusion. It found that “noncitizens charged with drug crimes and with an
ICE detainer spend [seventy-three] days longer in jail before being discharged,
on average, than those without an ICE detainer,” even after controlling for race
and offense level.159
Until recently, detainers often prolonged detention because many law
enforcement agencies believed that detainers were obligatory.160 In practice,
this means that police departments and sheriff’s offices regularly extended
confinement beyond a migrant’s criminal release date for no reason other than
the ICE detainer.161 After previously taking the position that detainers were
mandatory,162 federal officials are now clear that detainers are merely requests
to keep the arrestee imprisoned. Indeed, the standard detainer form that ICE
used for years explicitly noted, “IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU: Maintain
custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS, excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject would
have otherwise been released from your custody.”163 A few lines later, the form
adds, “you are not authorized to hold the subject beyond these 48
hours.”164 The only federal circuit to have addressed whether detainers are
mandatory takes the position that they are not.165
Immigration detainers suffered a heavy blow in 2014 when a federal court
concluded that they violate the Fourth Amendment.166 To avoid civil liability
for illegally detaining individuals, law enforcement agencies nationwide
quickly changed their detainer practices by limiting the extent to which they

158. Id.
159. SHAHANI, supra note 150, at 3.
160. E.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 640 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting Lehigh County,
Pennsylvania’s position that detainers are mandatory obligations on local law enforcement
agencies); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at
*5 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (recording county jail officials’ argument that they were required to
maintain a woman in custody because ICE had issued a detainer against her); see also Lasch,
Enforcing the Limits, supra note 144, at 174 (describing local law enforcement agencies’
willingness to comply with detainer requests). But see Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers,
supra note 144, at 678 (describing budding opposition to detainers).
161. See, e.g., Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *5 (explaining that jail officials
kept the arrestee, against whom ICE had lodged an immigration detainer, in jail for nineteen hours
after she should have been released at the completion of her sentence).
162. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers, supra note 144, at 676.
163. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS FORM I-247 (12/12), IMMIGRATION DETAINER—
NOTICE OF ACTION (2012), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/immigration-detainerform.pdf.
164. Id.
165. Galarza, 745 F.3d at 642.
166. See Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *9–11.

1478

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:1449

abide by detainers or by prohibiting compliance entirely.167 A few months later,
DHS itself announced a change to its detainer practice. Instead of issuing
requests for detention, ICE now issues only “requests that state or local law
enforcement notify ICE of a pending release during the time that person is
otherwise in custody under state or local authority.”168 This likely cures any
Fourth Amendment concern, but it does not alter the detainer’s utility in
identifying individuals to imprison by pairing state and local police work with
ICE investigative abilities. All it does is shift the inquiry forward in time.
III.
THE IMMIGRATION-IMPRISONMENT PIPELINE
Immigration imprisonment clearly occupies a prominent role in
contemporary immigration law enforcement policies and results in the
confinement of upwards of half a million people annually. Under the current
state of criminal and civil immigration law enforcement, imprisonment for
allegedly violating laws regulating migration can result from a variety of
policing initiatives. Some are unquestionably features of the criminal justice
system, while others are unmistakably part of the federal government’s civil
law enforcement regime. Still others are creatures of a different ilk, making
their categorization into one of these two traditional areas of law rather
difficult. Whether they are civil or criminal law enforcement tactics, or
something more difficult to classify, they all share one key characteristic:
formal boundaries are becoming increasingly less relevant as criminal tactics
reflect civil norms and vice versa. Consequently, the pathways to immigration
imprisonment emblematize the burgeoning crimmigration law enforcement
regime. To understand the immigration-imprisonment pipeline, this Part
undertakes the first systematic mapping of the many ways migrants are and
have been incarcerated due to migration activity.
A. Federal Civil Immigration Imprisonment
The nation’s civil-immigration detainees are apprehended through the
efforts of two principal units within DHS: Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), in particular its Border Patrol division, and ICE. Both Agencies are
charged with identifying and apprehending potentially removable

167. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Recent Federal Court Decision Finding It Unlawful for a
Sheriff’s Department to Honor ICE Detainer Requests (May 2, 2014), http://www.ilrc.org/files
/documents/letter_to_counties_re_miranda-olivares.pdf.
168. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t et al., Secure
Communities 2 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Memo], at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default
/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf.
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individuals.169 With more than forty thousand agents between the two
Agencies,170 both have done so with immense frequency. Combined, they
apprehended 662,483 individuals in fiscal year 2013.171 ICE places these
individuals in custody when its Enforcement and Removal Operations division
decides that continued detention is appropriate.172
Initial detention at the time that immigration authorities charge a migrant
as removable is not the only route to civil immigration detention. ICE also
maintains a specialized law enforcement program whose mission is to identify,
locate, and arrest migrants with an outstanding removal order, migrants who
returned to the United States without authorization after having been removed,
or migrants who have been convicted of a crime.173 This initiative, the National
Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP), has 129 “fugitive operations teams” (an
increase of twenty-five teams from recent years)174 and is supported by a
“fugitive operations” support center.175 ICE claims that NFOP has
“dramatically expand[ed]” its ability to “locate, arrest and remove” migrants
who “ha[ve] failed to depart the United States based upon a final order of
removal, deportation or exclusion; or who ha[ve] failed to report to [ICE] after
receiving notice to do so.”176 The former ICE Director John Morton explained
NFOP’s role in the Agency’s enforcement strategy: “[T]he sound
administration of the nation’s immigration system depends on an efficient, fair,
and meaningful removal process,” thus “final orders of removal should be
enforced and . . . those who knowingly disobey or evade a final order of
removal should be apprehended and removed.”177

169. JOHN F. SIMANSKI, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL REPORT: IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013, at 1–2 (2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files
/publications /ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf.
170. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FY 2015, supra note 65, at CBP-14, ICE87.
171. See SIMANSKI, supra note 169, at 3 tbl.1.
172. Id. at 2.
173. See Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enf’t, to Field Office Directors and All Fugitive Operation Team Members, National Fugitive
Operations Program: Priorities, Goals, and Expectations 1 (Dec. 8, 2009),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/nfop_priorities_goals_expectations.pdf
[hereinafter NFOP Memo].
174. See MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS
REPORT R42057, INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL
ALIENS 17 (2013). The program counted fifty teams in October 2006. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-07-34, AN ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS TEAMS 1 (2007)
[hereinafter FOT ASSESSMENT], http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_07-34_Mar07.pdf.
175. Fugitive Operations, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, http://www.ice.gov
/fugitive-operations (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
176. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET:
ICE FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PROGRAM (2007), http://www.colliergov.net/Modules/Show
Document.aspx?documentid=15660.
177. NFOP Memo, supra note 173, at 1.
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Since 2003, when Congress first funded NFOP,178 the program has, with
few exceptions, steadily resulted in more arrests year after year.179 NFOP
agents search for suspects “at worksites, in residential areas, and at other
locations.”180 In fiscal year 2003, for example, NFOP claimed 1,900 arrests.181
The next year, NFOP operations resulted in 6,584 arrests.182 By fiscal year
2013, however, NFOP officers made 31,222 arrests, including 23,504 migrants
with a criminal record.183 Surely this impressive growth is at least in part
attributable to the remarkable budget increases the program has seen since its
launch in 2003 with a $9 million budget.184 “By FY 2010, its budget had grown
to $230 million,” though that dropped to $132.9 million in fiscal year 2013.185
Though NFOP teams are supposed to target migrants who pose a public
safety risk,186 there is reason to doubt that actually occurs. From June 2004 to
January 2006, the Agency required that only 75 percent of people apprehended
by each NFOP team be migrants with a criminal history.187 Even if teams met
this goal, a quarter of arrestees would have no criminal history. NFOP
apprehension data analyzed by the department’s inspector general suggests that
many teams did not meet this goal. From the 2003 to 2006 fiscal years, the
inspector general found that NFOP teams reported apprehending 16,712 noncriminals and 13,661 criminals.188 NFOP teams continue to capture noncriminals. Only 9 percent of NFOP arrests in 2007, for example, involved
fugitive migrants with criminal convictions.189 Similarly, according to ICE,
fewer than half the people arrested by an NFOP team during the fourth quarter
of the 2010 fiscal year had any criminal history.190
Even considering only those migrants with a conviction, not all pose a
public safety risk. DHS does not provide data about how many of the migrants
apprehended through NFOP with a criminal history had been convicted of a
violent crime. An independent review of 2007 NFOP arrest data, however,
178. Though Congress created NFOP in fiscal year 2002, it did not receive its own
appropriations until the following year. See FOT ASSESSMENT, supra note 174, at 5, 8.
179. See ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 174, at 21 tbl.6.
180. Id. at 17.
181. DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 102 (2013).
182. ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 174, at 21 tbl.6.
183. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 61 (2014)
[hereinafter DHS BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FY 2015].
184. See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 181, at 102.
185. Id.; ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 174, at 19 tbl.5.
186. NFOP Memo, supra note 173, at 2.
187. FOT ASSESSMENT, supra note 174, at 8.
188. Id. at 9 tbl.2.
189. MARGOT MENDELSON ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN
EXAMINATION OF ICE’S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PROGRAM 3 (2009).
190. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURE
COMMUNITIES: QUARTERLY REPORT—FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS, FOURTH
QUARTER 13 (2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatus
reportfy104thquarter.pdf.
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indicated “aliens posing a threat to the community or with a violent criminal
conviction represented just 2 percent of all [NFOP team] arrests.”191
Whether arrested because of an outstanding removal order, entry into the
United States without authorization, or a conviction, individuals taken into
custody by an NFOP team spend time in immigration imprisonment. Those
with an outstanding removal order are likely removed rather quickly without
any additional immigration court process. Individuals who entered without
authorization can be placed in removal or criminal proceedings at the federal
government’s election, and those who have already been convicted are placed
in removal proceedings where they are almost always subject to mandatory
detention.
Another program known as the “Criminal Alien Removal Initiative”
(CARI) adds to the array of immigration-imprisonment entry points. Not much
is known about CARI; indeed, its very existence appears to have been
discovered accidentally by New Orleans immigrants’ rights advocates.192 Like
NFOP, CARI appears to target migrants with a criminal record.193 Though
advocates claim that CARI operations have resulted in detention of migrants
without a criminal record, no systematic examination of the initiative has
occurred, so it is impossible to verify these claims.194 At this time, it is equally
impossible to determine how many people have been detained through CARI.
The recent revelation of its existence at the very least indicates that the full
extent of federal programs in this area is not publicly known.
B. Federal Criminal Immigration Imprisonment
To identify, apprehend, and confine tens of thousands of criminal
immigration law offenders, the federal government relies on prosecutorial and
judicial initiatives that single out migrants for expedited treatment in the
criminal justice system. This allows the federal government to move more
people through federal prisons. One prosecutorial innovation in particular,
known as fast-track plea agreements, has significantly raised the stakes for
migrants who interact with the criminal justice system. Fast-track pleas offer
immigration-crime defendants a reduced sentence in exchange for the
migrant’s quick consent to removal.195 Alan D. Bersin was the U.S. Attorney
191.
192.

MENDELSON ET AL., supra note 189, at 13.
SAKET SONI ET AL., NEW ORLEANS WORKERS’ CTR. FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, THE
CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVAL INITIATIVE IN NEW ORLEANS: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S
BRUTAL NEW FRONTIER IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 5 (2013).
193. See Katie Rucke, ICE Hunts Immigrants in New Orleans, MINTPRESS NEWS (Jan. 31,
2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.mintpressnews.com/178507/178507.
194. See SONI ET AL., supra note 192, at 7.
195. See Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin, The Rule of Law at the Margin: Reinventing
Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of California, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285, 301 (1998);
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All U.S.
Attorneys, Department Policy on Early Disposition or “Fast-Track” Programs 3–4 (Jan. 31, 2012)
[hereinafter Cole Memo], www.justice.gov/dag/fast-track-program.pdf.
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for the Southern District of California when fast-track plea agreements
emerged and later the Commissioner of CBP. He has documented how these
agreements came into being. He notes that the federal government began to
devote considerable resources to immigration law violations along the nation’s
southwest border in the mid-1990s and gave the Border Patrol in particular
more staff, more surveillance equipment, and, most importantly, a new
computerized database with which to track every person apprehended entering
the United States clandestinely.196
This computerized tracking system positioned immigration officials quite
well to identify individuals for prosecution for the federal crime of illegal
reentry after removal, an offense that is quite difficult to defend against and
that authorizes as much as twenty years imprisonment (though few receive that
much).197 Realizing that the local federal criminal justice system “was ill
equipped to handle the large number of additional criminal alien cases,” Bersin
and his staff launched “a ‘fast-track’ system whereby discovery was provided,
and a pre-indictment plea offer made, within [twenty-four] hours of
arraignment.”198 Defendants could usually plead to the misdemeanor federal
crime of illegal entry, which caps imprisonment at six months for a first-time
offense and two years for subsequent offenses.199
This practice spread like wildfire. Initially limited to the San Diego area,
by the end of May 2009 there were twenty-seven fast-track programs in
seventeen judicial districts. On March 1, 2012, it became available for use in
any jurisdiction in which felony illegal reentry offenses are prosecuted.200 A
2013 analysis of immigration prosecutions nationwide between fiscal years
2006 and 2009 indicates that 38.1 percent of immigration prosecutions in
districts that had a fast-track program were fast-tracked.201 Most judicial
districts that regularly use a fast-track program experienced an increase in the
number of immigration criminal prosecutions alongside increased reliance on

196. Bersin & Feigin, supra note 195, at 299–300.
197. INA § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012); see also Jane L. McClellan & Jon M. Sands,
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Policy Paradox of Early Disposition Programs: A Primer
on “Fast-Track” Sentences, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 517, 521 (2006). The average sentence for illegal
reentry offenders between 2008 and 2012 was nineteen months. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
QUICK FACTS: ILLEGAL REENTRY OFFENSES 1 (undated), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files
/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Illegal_Reentry.pdf.
198. Bersin & Feigin, supra note 195, at 300–01. Civil immigration authorities in South
Texas created a conceptually similar initiative in the late 1980s to process a sudden large increase
in asylum applications. KAHN, supra note 109, at 210. INS officials sought to decide 96 percent of
asylum applications within three hours of interviewing the applicant. Id.
199. Bersin & Feigin, supra note 195, at 301; see also INA § 275.
200. See KIDEUK KIM, THE URBAN INST., ORGANIZATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND EARLY
DISPOSITION PROGRAMS IN FEDERAL COURTS xii (2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij
/grants/244386.pdf; Cole Memo, supra note 195, at 3–4.
201. KIM, supra note 200, at 40 exhibit 6.
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fast-track pleas.202 As Bersin put it, “[t]he fast track system allowed this
explosion in filings.”203
The fast-track program directly increases immigration imprisonment in
two ways. First, by raising the stakes of contesting prosecutors’ charges, fasttrack plea agreements have not only hastened the pace of prosecutions but also
increased the number of criminal immigration cases that prosecutors can
lodge.204 The U.S. Attorneys’ Office that Bersin oversaw, for example, went
from filing 240 illegal reentry cases in 1994 to 1,334 in 1995.205 By 2001,
roughly five thousand immigration prosecutions were fast-tracked.206 Given
that most immigration offenders are detained before and after conviction (and
almost all are convicted), increasing the number of prosecutions means
increasing the number of migrants confined in a given year. Second, the fasttrack program applies only to migrants taken into federal custody. The
enormous increase in prosecutions that the policy allows, therefore, also
increases the number of migrants confined.
Specialized federal criminal procedures involving migrants, like the fasttrack program, do not end there. Despite the requirement in Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that “the court must address the defendant
personally in open court” before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere,207 another initiative relaxes procedural protections afforded
migrants by altering judges’ conduct. Through Operation Streamline,
immigration defendants regularly appear en masse.208 Rather than process each
defendant’s case individually, federal judges address multiple defendants
simultaneously. In some instances, a judge might go through the plea colloquy
with as many as seventy defendants at once.209 Bending normal federal
criminal procedures allows federal prosecutors and judges to move substantial
numbers of immigration defendants through the court system.
Though Operation Streamline allows judicial efficiency to rise, it does so
at an important and obvious cost: comprehension. A judge speaking to a
courtroom full of immigration defendants at the same time cannot be sure that
they understand what is happening. Indeed, a judge cannot be sure what every
defendant is saying or even whether every defendant is saying something. As
the Ninth Circuit put it, Operation Streamline proceedings result in “an

202. Id. at 34.
203. Bersin & Feigin, supra note 195, at 302.
204. Thomas E. Gorman, Comment, Fast-Track Sentencing Disparity: Rereading
Congressional Intent to Resolve the Circuit Split, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 479, 485 (2010).
205. Bersin & Feigin, supra note 195, at 302.
206. Gorman, supra note 204, at 486.
207. FED. R. CRIM P. 11(b)(1).
208. See Joanna Jacobbi Lydgate, Comment, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation
Streamline, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 481, 532 (2010).
209. See United States v. Escamilla-Rojas, 640 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011).
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indistinct murmur or medley of yeses.”210 The Ninth Circuit is an outlier in its
resistance. Operation Streamline proceedings regularly operate in federal
district courts throughout the Southwest.211 Even in the Ninth Circuit,
Operation Streamline continues, though in a slightly modified fashion; judges
now accept pleas individually or in small groups while the rest of the plea
colloquy can still be performed en masse.212
C. State Immigration Imprisonment
Other programs have moved and continue to move migrants into jails and
prisons as a result of state or local officers’ efforts. No initiative better reflects
this practice than the much-discussed “287(g) program.” Under the
presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, DHS relied heavily on
intergovernmental law enforcement initiatives authorized by INA section
287(g). That statutory provision allows DHS to enter into agreements with
local law enforcement agencies to essentially deputize local police officers to
conduct their own investigations of violations of federal immigration law.213
Though ICE has significantly scaled down its reliance on 287(g) programs to
identify potentially removable individuals, the Agency continues to operate
thirty-six 287(g) programs throughout the United States.214 ICE claims that
287(g) has identified 373,800 potentially removable migrants since January
2006.215 Though this figure does not indicate how many of those migrants were
detained, there is reason to believe that 287(g) has resulted in hundreds of

210. United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2009).
211. See Fernanda Santos, Detainees Sentenced in Seconds in ‘Streamline’ Justice on Border,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2014, at A12.
212. See United States v. Arqueta-Ramos, 730 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“[C]onclud[ing] that, although the court did not err by advising the defendants of their rights en
masse, it erred by not questioning Arqueta-Ramos individually to ensure that she understood her
rights.”); United States v. Diaz-Ramirez, 646 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding an Operation
Streamline proceeding after Roblero-Solis).
213. See INA § 287(g)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2012).
214. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g
[hereinafter 287(g) Fact Sheet] (last visited Aug. 21, 2015); FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End
Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New National Detainer
Guidance to Further Focus Resources, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1212/121221washingtondc2.htm#statement (“ICE has also
decided not to renew any of its agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies that
operate task forces under the 287(g) program.”). One group of researchers noted that the task
force model that DHS ended in 2012 is less efficient than the jail enforcement model that the
department continues to use. RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND
DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 29–30
(2011). In fact, DHS has increased the number of jail enforcement 287(g) agreements in place
since 2012. See id. (noting that ICE maintained thirty-two jail enforcement agreements in
December 2012); 287(g) Fact Sheet, supra (stating that ICE currently operates thirty-four jail
enforcement programs).
215. 287(g) Fact Sheet, supra note 214.
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thousands of detentions, because at least 108,000 detainers were issued as a
result of 287(g) investigations during the 2009 and 2010 fiscal years alone.216
Meanwhile, a similar phenomenon has occurred at the state level. The one
section of Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070, the so-called “show-me-your-papers”
law, that survived constitutional challenge requires state or local police officers
to check the immigration status of people they suspect lack authorization to be
present in the United States.217 Though it raises important practical questions of
how well-equipped police officers are to gauge whether a person is “unlawfully
present” in the United States,218 this requirement leaves little doubt that state
and local police are to become central figures in regulating migration.
Moreover, by converting police into immigration law investigators, the law
forces officers to depart from the typical practice of investigating state criminal
conduct. In the process, it increases the contact points through which
immigration imprisonment might result.
At times, state governments and localities participate in moving
individuals into immigration imprisonment by responding to financial
incentives offered by the federal government. The State Criminal Alien
Assistance Program (SCAAP) taps state and local criminal law enforcement
processes to move migrants into immigration imprisonment by offering to pay
part of the cost of confinement.219 Created by a provision of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and run by the Justice Department,
SCAAP reimburses state and local governments “for a portion of the
correctional officer salary costs associated with incarcerating”220 unauthorized
migrants who have been convicted of either one felony or two misdemeanors,
and “were incarcerated for [four] or more consecutive days.”221
To determine who fits the SCAAP eligibility criteria, the federal
government requires that local law enforcement agents “us[e] ‘due diligence’ to
identify and report eligible undocumented individuals to ICE,” which
determines whether they lack authorization to be in the United States.222 By
conditioning reimbursement on a requirement that police officials help identify
potentially removable individuals, SCAAP widens the net of immigration law

216. CAPPS ET AL., supra note 214, at 18.
217. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509–10 (2012).
218. Id.
219. See Anjana Malhotra, The Immigrant and Miranda, 66 SMU L. REV. 277, 328 (2013)
(describing SCAAP as “the central referral tool for incorporating local law enforcement agencies
into civil and criminal immigration enforcement”).
220. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-187, CRIMINAL ALIEN STATISTICS:
INFORMATION ON INCARCERATIONS, ARRESTS AND COSTS 1–2 (2011).
221. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE CRIMINAL ALIEN
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SCAAP) 2 (2014), https://www.bja.gov/Funding/14SCAAP_
Guidelines.pdf (guidelines for Fiscal Year 2014); see also Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 20301, 108 Stat. 1796, 1823–24 (codified at
INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012)).
222. Malhotra, supra note 219, at 329.
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screening—all while individuals are firmly within the custody of state or local
officials.223 After examining SCAAP’s operations across several years, legal
scholar Anjana Malhotra concluded that “SCAAP and ICE statistics suggest
that local agencies are referring large numbers of individuals that could be
subject to civil or criminal violations through SCAAP.”224 Malhotra found that,
under the aegis of SCAAP, “local agencies referred more than 660,000 eligible
criminal alien inmates to ICE” from 2004 to 2011, all of whom were
potentially removable under civil immigration law.225 Meanwhile, police
agencies identified approximately another 162,000 detained migrants who “had
been previously arrested at least once for a criminal or civil immigration
offense prior to their referral,” meaning they were likely eligible for criminal
prosecutions for illegal reentry.226
D. Federal-State Crossover Immigration Imprisonment
While criminal and civil administrative law provide the legal basis
justifying detention, the federal government has crafted an important set of
initiatives designed to ensure that any migrant interacting with law enforcement
who has engaged in unauthorized conduct remains within the control of
policing authorities, which is to say, imprisoned. These initiatives meld
criminal justice and administrative processes while simultaneously tapping the
resources of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Chief among
these are the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) and Secure Communities.
CAP increases the government’s ability to detain more people, with the
goal of removing the maximum number of migrants who engage in criminal
activity, regardless of whether that activity is directly related to immigration.227
To achieve this objective, CAP depends on close collaboration between
criminal law enforcement agencies and ICE.228 Its sizeable dedicated staff—
approximately 1,250 ICE officers—is assigned to jails and prisons nationwide
as well as to off-site videoconferencing sites.229 The ICE officers screen for
removability of people arrested upon suspicion of committing a crime or
incarcerated after conviction.230 A specialized initiative within CAP provides
additional resources to law enforcement agencies in the Phoenix area. Under
this initiative, CAP personnel must respond to law enforcement requests about

223. See id.
224. Id. at 331.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. See Lasch, Enforcing the Limits, supra note 144, at 166–67. The CAP combines two
initiatives launched in the 1980s, the Alien Criminal Apprehension Program (ACAP) and the
Institutional Hearing Program (later dubbed the Institutional Removal Program (IRP)), to target
migrants who come into contact with state or local criminal law enforcement authorities. Id.
228. See ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 174, at 14.
229. See id.
230. See id.
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an arrestee’s immigration status around-the-clock. In fiscal year 2011, this
initiative alone resulted in more than 1,700 arrests.231
Another specialized CAP component, the Violent Criminal Alien Section
(VCAS), flags for federal prosecutors individuals who have allegedly
committed federal immigration crimes. In fiscal year 2013 alone, VCAS helped
produce 7,650 criminal indictments.232 To make this work possible, Congress
has supported CAP with approximately $1.4 billion between the 2004 and 2013
fiscal years, including a significant jump from $6.6 million in 2004 to $137.5
million in 2007.233
CAP has been quite successful with respect to the number of people taken
into ICE custody. Between 2004 and 2011, the Agency arrested 1,116,877
people through CAP, making this the ICE program that led to most arrests
during this eight-year period.234 In New York, CAP is responsible for 77
percent of all ICE apprehensions, including almost 6,500 arrests in 2008.235
Importantly, many of these individuals are not prosecuted or convicted of a
crime. A study of CAP arrests in New York City, for example, showed that 37
percent of migrants taken into ICE custody through CAP had no criminal
history; New York Police Department officers merely arrested and booked
them and then transferred them to ICE.236 Overall, then, CAP has expanded the
federal government’s practice of imprisoning migrants like no other single
policy innovation.
Another DHS initiative, the Secure Communities program, likewise
demonstrates the federal government’s willingness to blur the criminal and
civil law enforcement distinction to expand its ability to detain migrants.
Launched in just six counties and Boston in 2008, the program was active in
every jurisdiction in the United States by January 22, 2013.237 Where CAP
places ICE officers in jails and prisons throughout the country to gather the
information necessary to determine whether an arrestee is potentially
removable, Secure Communities relies on the state and local police officers
who are already in those jails and prisons to gather that information and
electronically forward it to DHS.238 Even prior to this program, law

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id.
DHS BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FY 2015, supra note 183, at 61.
ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 174, at 19 tbl.5.
Id. at 21 tbl.6.
INSECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 94, at 6.
See id. at 5.
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECOND
CONGRESSIONAL STATUS REPORT COVERING THE FOURTH QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR
SECURE COMMUNITIES: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS
8 (2008) [hereinafter DHS STATUS REPORT]; U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS
(2013) [hereinafter ACTIVATED
JURISDICTIONS].
238. See Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of
Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1126 (2013) (explaining that
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enforcement officers at various levels shared investigative information. When
police officers across the country make arrests in furtherance of their traditional
public safety functions, they routinely send fingerprint data to their state’s
criminal records repository.239 Those state agencies then forward the fingerprint
data to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for criminal background
checks.240 Secure Communities builds on that time-tested practice by
instructing the FBI to share the fingerprint data it receives from the local police
with DHS, which then runs the data through its massive immigration-specific
databases.241 DHS then determines which arrestees are potentially removable
from the United States for a civil violation of immigration laws.242 Either
before or after conclusion of the criminal process resulting from the migrant’s
arrest, ICE agents frequently take custody of migrants flagged through the
Secure Communities database queries, and begin the removal process.243
Indeed, ICE agents frequently take identified migrants into custody even when
no criminal process follows the arrest, either because criminal charges were not
filed or were dropped soon after filing. In this way, Secure Communities “has
transformed the landscape of immigration enforcement by allowing ICE to
effectively run federal immigration checks on every individual booked into a
local county jail, usually while still in pretrial custody.”244
Though it relies on the policing work of criminal justice actors, Secure
Communities has had an enormous impact on civil immigration imprisonment.
In 2009, the first full fiscal year after the program’s launch, ICE removed
10,688 individuals who had been convicted of some crime.245 ICE did not
report how many were detained pending removal proceedings, but, given their
criminal histories, the likelihood is that most spent time in an immigration
prison. Indeed, 3,368 of these individuals were convicted of an aggravated
felony or at least two felonies, making them subject to mandatory custody
under INA section 236(c) or high-priority candidates for detention.246 Four

Secure Communities “seek[s] to establish . . . a ‘virtual presence in every jail’ at the moment that
every arrestee nationwide is booked”).
239. Id. at 1127.
240. TASK FORCE ON SECURE CMTYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2011); see also Kalhan, Immigration Policing, supra note 238, at 1127.
241. TASK FORCE ON SECURE CMTYS., supra note 240, at 4; see also Kalhan, supra note
238, at 1127. According to Kalhan, the DHS database “holds records on over 148 million subjects
who have had any contact with DHS, other agencies, and even other governments.” Id.
242. TASK FORCE ON SECURE CMTYS., supra note 240, at 4–5; see also Kalhan, supra note
238, at 1128.
243. See Kalhan, supra note 238, at 1128.
244. AARTI KOHLI ET AL., THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC.
POLICY, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE
PROCESS 1 (2011).
245. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURE
COMMUNITIES: IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY MONTHLY STATISTICS THROUGH SEPTEMBER
30, 2011, at 2 (2011).
246. See id. at 2, 83.
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years later, in fiscal year 2013, Secure Communities identified “190,951 . . .
individuals charged with or convicted of Level 1 offenses, which include
violent crimes . . . and other aggravated felonies.”247 An analysis of Secure
Communities’ operations as of January 31, 2010, indicated that 83 percent of
people identified through Secure Communities were booked into ICE custody,
compared to 62 percent of all people apprehended by DHS.248 Overall,
according to a separate report analyzing data between the program’s launch in
October 2008 and May 31, 2011, “more than 260,000 people were . . . booked
into ICE custody as a result” of a Secure Communities database hit.249
Importantly, at its highest point during the time span covered by this study,
Secure Communities was active in roughly 45 percent of jurisdictions in the
United States,250 a far cry from the 100 percent coverage it later claimed,251
suggesting that many more people were eventually identified and detained
pursuant to this initiative.
Moreover, it seems that few are able to get out of detention on bond while
removal proceedings are ongoing. ICE granted bond to a mere 2 percent of
people taken into custody under Secure Communities, while only slightly
more—6 percent—received bond redetermination hearings before an
immigration judge.252 On average, migrants detained through Secure
Communities spent twenty-eight days confined, though researchers identified
one person whom ICE had detained for more than five hundred days.253
In a rather extraordinary turn of events, Secure Communities came under
intense criticism even as it was rolled out. Activists, advocates, law
enforcement officials, and several prominent elected officials complained that
the program drove an unnecessary and unwanted wedge between police
agencies and migrant communities.254 Responding to that criticism, on
November 20, 2014, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson announced
that DHS would terminate Secure Communities.255
Whatever victory critics might have declared was short-lived. In the very
memorandum in which Johnson declared Secure Communities’ demise, he

247. DHS BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FY 2015, supra note 183, at 61.
248. KOHLI ET AL., supra note 244, at 7, 14.
249. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, SECURE COMMUNITIES (July 11, 2011),
http://immigrationforum.org/blog/secure-communities-2.
250. Id. (stating that Secure Communities was active in 1,417 jurisdictions in June 2011).
According to DHS, there are 3,181 jurisdictions in the United States. ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS,
supra note 237.
251. ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 237; DHS STATUS REPORT, supra note 237, at
8.
252. KOHLI ET AL., supra note 244, at 8.
253. Id. at 7.
254. See Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to Obama’s Immigration Strategy,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2011, at A18.
255. Johnson Memo, supra note 168, at 2.
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announced its replacement: the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP).256 As
with Secure Communities, DHS officers following the PEP protocol will take
fingerprint data obtained by state or local police officers and sift it through
DHS immigration databases. Because DHS claims it will only take custody of
individuals who meet its top civil immigration enforcement priorities, PEP is
more narrowly tailored than Secure Communities. Though this will likely
affect the specific characteristics of the people taken into ICE custody, it is
unlikely to affect how many people are moved into immigration imprisonment,
because there is no shortage of people who meet the department’s highest
enforcement priorities. Moreover, PEP does not fundamentally alter the process
for identifying and moving such people into immigration imprisonment. Like
Secure Communities, it uses the resources of the state criminal justice system
to identify individuals for civil immigration detention.
On the whole, this panoply of initiatives creates a broad net that leads
hundreds of thousands of people into jails, prisons, or immigration detention
centers annually for allegedly having engaged in prohibited migration-related
activity. This is not a reality to be taken lightly. Part IV explains why this
reality came to be.
IV.
RHETORIC OF CRIMINALITY
Immigration law has been subsumed under a rhetoric of criminality that
frames migrants as the specter of dangerousness.257 Legislators and government
bureaucrats, disinclined to release ostensibly dangerous individuals onto the
streets, have every incentive to favor imprisonment.258 Being able to point to
the steel and concrete of prison walls and the annual statistics of an evergreater number of people incarcerated because of a suspected or confirmed
immigration law violation gives political actors the proof they need to show the
public that they are doing something about the danger in our midst.259
A. Migrant Vilification
In the 1980s, law and politics in the United States began to focus more on
the threat of crime and the danger migrants pose. This new focus accompanied

256. Id.
257. See Mary Romero, State Violence, and the Social and Legal Construction of Latino
Criminality: From El Bandido to Gang Member, 78 DENVER U. L. REV. 1081, 1106 (2001)
(explaining that Latina/o immigrants have been constructed as criminals and that this framing has
been applied to immigration law enforcement); see also DANIEL WILSHER, IMMIGRATION
DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY, POLITICS 275 (2012) (“[S]ecuritizing migration can be selfdefeating for ‘the more migration is feared as a security threat, the more of a security threat it
becomes.’” (quoting CONTROLLING A NEW MIGRATION WORLD 21 (V. Guiraudon & C. Joppke,
eds., 2001))); Johnson Memo, supra note 168, at 11, 19.
258. See LOGAN, supra note 73.
259. See ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 80 (2010).
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a greater desire to punish. Among the most influential examples of this legal
and political shift is the “broken windows” theory popularized in an influential
Atlantic Monthly article by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. The article
posited that minor crime would progressively lead to more serious crime if not
quashed.260 The push to “crack[] down on crime” quickly led to the massive
and racially skewed criminal incarceration growth that legal scholar Michelle
Alexander has dubbed the “new Jim Crow”261 and sociologist Loïc Wacquant
refers to as “hyperincarceration.”262
Following in that vein, for roughly the last thirty years, public discussions
of immigration and migrants have frequently included references to crime and
dangerousness. Cubans who left the island from the port of Mariel in the early
1980s were thought to have been the cast-offs from Castro’s prisons and, as the
title of a 1984 U.S. News & World Report article put it, represented “Castro’s
‘Crime Bomb’ Inside [the] U.S.”263 Perhaps the most memorable example of
this linkage between Cuban migrants and crime comes from the 1983
Hollywood thriller Scarface, in which Al Pacino stars as a young Cuban
migrant who becomes a violent drug trafficker in Florida.264 Like the Cubans,
the Haitians who arrived in large numbers in the early 1980s were also linked
to crime. Reflecting their racialization as black, they were viewed as having
melded into the allegedly rampant drug activity carried out by African
Americans.265 Much the same goes for Jamaican migrants. As Republican
Congressman Lamar Smith claimed in 1987, “Jamaicans, mostly illegal aliens,
have developed a massive criminal organization that imports and distributes
narcotics.”266 More recently, another Republican Congressman, Steve King
from Iowa, dismissed efforts to provide a legalization path for unauthorized
migrants brought to the United States as children by alleging, “For every one
who’s a valedictorian, there’s another 100 out there who weigh 130 pounds and

260. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
261. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 42.
262. Wacquant, supra note 20.
263. John S. Lang et al., Castro’s “Crime Bomb” Inside U.S., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Jan. 16, 1984, at 27; see also MARK S. HAMM, THE ABANDONED ONES: THE IMPRISONMENT AND
UPRISING OF THE MARIEL BOAT PEOPLE 51 (1995); Stephanie J. Silverman, Immigration
Detention in America: A History of Its Expansion and a Study of Its Significance 9 (Univ. of
Oxford, Working Paper No. 80, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1867366.
264. See STEVEN BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGOS: LATINOS, LAW, AND THE AMERICAN
IMAGINATION 28–29 (2003); see also Ediberto Román, Who Exactly Is Living La Vida Loca?:
The Legal and Political Consequences of Latino-Latina Ethnic and Racial Stereotypes in Film
and Other Media, 4 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 37, 42–43 (2000).
265. See Teresa A. Miller, The Impact of Mass Incarceration on Immigration Policy, in
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 214, 232
(Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age:
The Rebirth of Immigration Prisons in the United States, 10 PUB. CULTURE 577, 593–94 (1998);
Silverman, supra note 263, at 9.
266. 133 CONG. REC. 28840 (1987) (statement of Rep. Smith).
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they’ve got calves the size of cantaloupes because they’re hauling 75 pounds of
marijuana across the desert.”267
This rhetoric has fundamentally changed the discursive boundaries about
migration. Rather than viewing migrants as deserving individuals in need of
safe harbor in the United States or as morally upright people coming to the
United States to work and perhaps reunite with family, migrants are frequently
portrayed as criminals.268 And as criminals, they are thought to be enemies of
the law-abiding public.269 Once migrants were framed this way, it became
logical for legislators to turn to strong-armed restrictive policies intended to
curtail this threat.270
B. Migrant Penalization
In a long series of statutes, Congress and multiple presidential
administrations enacted legislation that unmistakably linked immigrants with
criminality and, by extension, dangerousness. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, for example, authorized state and local law enforcement agencies to
request that the INS detain people believed to lack authorization to be in the
United States and who had been arrested on suspicion of having violated a
controlled substance offense.271 Less than two weeks later, the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, best known for its amnesty provisions
allowing millions of unauthorized migrants to regularize their status, statutorily
defined a “Marielito Cuban” as a Cuban national convicted of a felony and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and required the Justice Department to
reimburse states for incarcerating them.272 Two years later the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 funded INS agents’ involvement in a multiagency task force
“combating illegal alien involvement in drug trafficking and crimes of

267. Traci G. Lee, GOP’s Steve King on DREAMers: For Every Valedictorian, There Are
100 Drug Smugglers, MSNBC (July 23, 2013, 1:58 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/martinbashir/gops-steve-king-dreamers-every.
268. See TIMOTHY J. DUNN, THE MILITARIZATION OF THE U.S.–MEXICO BORDER, 1978–
1992: LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT DOCTRINE COMES HOME 87 (1996); JOSEPH NEVINS,
OPERATION GATEKEEPER AND BEYOND: THE WAR ON “ILLEGALS” AND THE REMAKING OF THE
U.S.–MEXICO BOUNDARY 97 (2d ed. 2010).
269. See DUNN, supra note 268, at 162–63.
270. See Lawston & Murillo, supra note 85, at 183 (“The use of the language ‘criminal’ and
‘lawbreakers’ effectively justifies the bellicose posturing of anti-immigrant discourses and
practices.”); see also Alissa R. Ackerman et al., The New Penology Revisited: The Criminalization
of Immigration as a Pacification Strategy, 11 JUST. POL’Y J. 1, 12 (2014) (“[T]he demonization of
immigration . . . creates a cultur[e] of perceived violence, where good ‘law’ abiding citizens feel
that their very lives are placed at risk by these ‘illegal alien[s].’ The discourse dehumanizes
undocumented immigrants, making it easier [to] afford them fewer ‘human rights.’”).
271. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1751, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-47 to
-48 (codified at INA §§ 212(a)(23), 241(a)(11), 287, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(23), 1251(a)(11), 1357
(2012)).
272. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 501, 100
Stat. 3359, 3443–44 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012)).
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violence.”273 That statute also introduced the “aggravated alien felon” into the
immigration law lexicon, referring to a type of crime committed, according to
U.S. Senator Alfonse D’Amato, by “a particularly dangerous class.”274
Originally defined as a conviction for murder, illicit trafficking in firearms, or
drug trafficking, the “aggravated felony” concept has since expanded to include
twenty-one categories of crimes, some of which include subparts, that range
from the most serious offenses to crimes as banal as mutilating a passport.275
The immigrant-crime entanglement continued unimpeded through the
1990s. President George H.W. Bush launched that decade’s version of the
immigration-crime rhetoric by describing the Immigration Act of 1990 as
important to his administration’s “war on drugs and violent crime,” in part
because “it provides for the expeditious deportation of aliens who, by their
violent criminal acts, forfeit their right to remain in this country.”276 These are
people, he added, who “jeopardize the safety and well-being of every American
resident.”277 In 1994, President Bill Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, a bill that, among other things, created the
SCAAP, which continues to fund state and local expenses incurred
incarcerating migrants.278 Two years later, Congress sent President Clinton a
pair of well-known bills, which he signed, that dramatically expanded the
immigration-crime nexus and, most pertinent here, the use of imprisonment.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) expanded the
federal government’s administrative immigration detention authorization.279
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, enacted a
few months after AEDPA, created the 287(g) programs that DHS continues to
use to identify and detain potentially removable migrants. It also expanded the
federal government’s computerized database of immigration status information,
which is at the heart of the Secure Communities program.280

273. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6151, 102 Stat. 4181, 4342.
274. 134 CONG. REC. 32649 (1988) (statement of Sen. D’Amato).
275. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469–70 (codified at INA § 101(a),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2013)); see also INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43) (2012).
276. President George Bush, Statement on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990 (Nov. 29,
1990), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19117.
277. Id.
278. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 130007, 108 Stat. 1796, 2029 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 note (2013)).
279. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(c),
110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (codified at INA § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2013)).
280. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563 to -564 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2013))
(regarding section 287(g) programs); id. at § 112, 110 Stat. at 3009-559 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1221) (regarding the computerized database system known as IDENT); see also U.S.
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURE COMMUNITIES:
IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY MONTHLY STATISTICS THROUGH OCTOBER 31, 2009 (Dec. 4,
2009),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide_interoperability_stats-fy2009.pdf
(explaining the IDENT database’s importance to Secure Communities).
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Though there has not been much immigration legislation enacted in the
twenty-first century, the few pieces that have made it through Congress and
past the President have continued the trend of framing immigration as a threat.
The Real ID Act of 2005, for example, placed special emphasis on terrorist
activity performed by migrants.281 A year after Congress passed the Real ID
Act, the House of Representatives approved a bill that would have made
unauthorized presence in the United States, with nothing more, a federal
crime.282 The bill ultimately failed in the Senate after massive immigrants’
rights protests, but not before it entrenched the impression that unauthorized
immigration was socially deviant.283
C. Migrant Institutionalization
Prison, of course, is not inevitable.284 There is nothing natural about
forcibly losing one’s liberty at the hands of the state. As legal scholar Malcolm
Feeley noted in his study of the growth of prisons, “The prison was not at all
obvious. Despite the fact that the prison is now so much taken for granted that
it has become synonymous with punishment, it was not always a foregone
conclusion.”285 Instead, it “was a product of the imagination of the late 18th
century,” conceived and disseminated in large part by a distinct set of people
Feeley describes as “entrepreneurs” who touted the prison as a means of
punishing offenders and offering them the opportunity to repent (hence the
term “penitentiary”) “at no or low cost to the state.”286 This rationalization
quickly took root in the United Kingdom and the United States, and the prison
as an institution took on a life of its own. “[W]ithin 50 years,” Feeley writes,
“the prison was so well inscribed in public imagination and so well established
on the landscape, that it was impossible to envision criminal punishment in its
absence. The prison had become synonymous with punishment.”287 Eventually,
in Feeley’s view, rationalization gave way to inertia. “[O]nce established,
conscience gave way to convenience”—that is, the prison continued to exist
because it was the most obvious answer to the difficult question of what to do
with criminals.288

281. Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, §§ 103, 105, 119 Stat. 302, 306–09,
309–10 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (2013)).
282. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R.
4437, 109th Cong. § 203 (2005).
283. See ALFONSO GONZALES, REFORM WITHOUT JUSTICE: LATINO MIGRANT POLITICS
AND THE HOMELAND SECURITY STATE 43 (2013).
284. See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 57 (2006);
Malcolm M. Feeley, Entrepreneurs of Punishment: The Legacy of Privatization, 4 PUNISHMENT &
SOC’Y 321, 333 (2002).
285. Feeley, supra note 284, at 333.
286. Id. at 328, 329, 333; see also Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons,
55 DUKE L.J. 437, 452 (2005).
287. Feeley, supra note 284, at 330.
288. Id.
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Though imprisonment became a core component of criminal punishment,
it was by no means the default sanction for criminal offenses in the United
States.289 Well into the second half of the twentieth century, “the main official
objective of criminal justice was correction.”290 Imprisonment was an available
option, but conviction frequently resulted in community supervision rather than
incarceration.291 “[P]enal confinement,” writes sociologist Bruce Western,
“was reserved for the most dangerous and incorrigible.”292
Beginning in the 1970s, the state and federal criminal justice systems
altered course from a focus on rehabilitation to a desire for punishment.293
Through a series of cultural and legal shifts that legal scholar and sociologist
David Garland has dubbed the “culture of control,”294 the well-known era of
mass incarceration was born.
As with the inevitability of the prison in Feeley’s account, there is
certainly nothing preordained about migrants losing their liberty behind barbed
wire and under the watchful eyes of security personnel. Though the first statute
authorizing detention of migrants for immigration-related activity was enacted
in 1891, imprisonment as a feature of immigration law enforcement is a
historical anomaly.295 With a few notable exceptions—Ellis Island on the East
Coast and especially Angel Island on the West Coast296—governments in the
United States have rarely detained individuals suspected of violating
immigration law. Indeed, from 1954 to 1980, the INS followed an internal
policy of not detaining except in unusual circumstances.297 That historical
practice changed suddenly in the early 1980s in response to the arrival of large
numbers of Cubans, Haitians, and Central Americans who were depicted as
dangerous and undeserving of the United States’ hospitality.298 In reaction to
this influx, Congress and multiple presidential administrations worked together

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

WESTERN, supra note 284, at 58.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id. at 58.
Id.
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 75–102 (2001).
295. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 8, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085–86. Before then, the federal
government relied principally on shipping companies to detain passengers not immediately
allowed to enter. See WILSHER, supra note 257, at 11, 19. At first, shipping companies kept
migrants on board, but after that became infeasible, they turned to on-shore detention facilities
that the companies operated. Id.
296. See David Manuel Hernández, Undue Process: Racial Genealogies of Immigrant
Detention, in CONSTRUCTING BORDERS/CROSSING BOUNDARIES: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND
IMMIGRATION 59, 73–74 (Caroline B. Brettell ed., 2007).
297. See MARK DOW, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS 7 (2004);
DUNN, supra note 268, at 46.
298. See DOW, supra note 297, at 7; Miller, supra note 265, at 225; Silverman, supra note
263, at 9.
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to vastly expand and fund statutory authorizations to detain in the course of
enforcing immigration law.299
Despite the relatively recent entry of large-scale immigration
imprisonment on the scene, politicians, bureaucrats, and advocates have now
largely accepted imprisonment’s central role in immigration policing. Few
people of any political persuasion publicly question the need to detain
migrants. In fact, many speak of imprisonment as a necessary component of a
“common sense” approach to immigration law reform.300 Without detention, it
would seem, there cannot be deportation and without deportation there is no
enforcement of immigration law.301 Detention came to be viewed as a natural
and required feature of effective immigration law enforcement policy.302
Emblematically, the disputes about the immigration-imprisonment system
focus on the scope of detention and the particulars of detention conditions,
which only highlight the lack of serious disagreement about the basic need for
such a system at all. Some members of Congress, for example, insist on
requiring ICE to pay for thirty-four thousand prison beds each night, while
DHS officials think that ICE should detain only those assessed as a flight risk
or public safety threat.303 Advocates frequently decry the use of criminal

299. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1360–72 (2014).
300. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 34 (2014) (advocating “common
sense immigration reform”); ICE FY 2015 Budget Justification, supra note 65, at 4 (requesting
funding for 30,539 DHS immigration detention beds); id. at 87 (explaining that the fiscal year
2015 White House budget proposal focuses resources on detaining migrants with specified
characteristics); id. at 156 (requesting funding for the State Criminal Alien Apprehension
Program); see also GONZALES, supra note 283, at 43–44 (quoting statements by two members of
Congress frequently considered to be “pro-immigrant,” Gene Green and Sheila Jackson Lee, in
which they implicitly accept that detention is a necessary part of immigration law enforcement);
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, FACT SHEET: IMMIGRATION REFORM (2013),
http://transequality.org/Resources/Factsheet_ImmigReformMay2013_FINAL.pdf (calling for less
detention as part of “common sense immigration reform” but not asking for no detention).
301. See Rutvica Andrijasevic, From Exception to Excess: Detention and Deportations
Across the Mediterranean Space, in THE DEPORTATION REGIME: SOVEREIGNTY, SPACE, AND THE
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 147, 148 (Nicholas De Genova & Nathalie Peutz eds., 2010) (positing
that detention “immobilizes” and the deportation that follows “expunges”); Galina Cornelisse,
Immigration Detention and the Territoriality of Universal Rights, in THE DEPORTATION REGIME,
supra, at 101, 116 (“[D]etention—like deportation—is a necessity for states that want to be seen
by their own populations to be in control of their borders.”); Nicholas De Genova, The
Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement, in THE DEPORTATION
REGIME, supra, at 33, 55 (“[T]he deportation regime must finally be situated alongside other
prospective resources of state power and sovereignty, including mass incarceration and even
extermination. Deportability would therefore have to be seen in a continuum with
‘detainability.’”).
302. See William Walters, Deportation, Expulsion, and the International Police of Aliens,
in THE DEPORTATION REGIME, supra note 301, at 69, 95; see also MARY BOSWORTH, INSIDE
IMMIGRATION DETENTION 36 (2014) (making a similar point about British practices).
303. ICE FY 2015 Budget Justification, supra note 65, at 4; Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Clinton’s
Inaccurate Claim that Immigrant Detention Facilities Have a Legal Requirement to Fill Beds, WASH.

2015]

NATURALIZING IMMIGRATION IMPRISONMENT

1497

prosecutions and incarceration to punish immigration law violations, seeking to
keep immigration enforcement formally civil. Academics and advocates,
meanwhile, criticize DHS’s continued reliance on correctional norms to detain
migrants, insisting that civil immigration detention should not resemble penal
confinement.304 But it is the rare politician, government official, academic,
immigrants’ rights advocate, immigration restriction proponent, or even activist
who challenges the premise that the United States ought to maintain an
immigration-detention system in the first place.305 At some point, then, the use
of imprisonment to enforce immigration law came to be seemingly beyond
question—that is, immigration imprisonment became so ordinary that it
became difficult to imagine a world without it.
That imprisonment is now viewed as normal represents the triumph of a
particular political project. Political scientist Alfonso Gonzales refers to this
project as the “anti-migrant bloc,” while others, including sociologist Tanya
Golash-Boza and political scientists Roxanne Lynne Doty and Elizabeth
Shannon Wheatley, describe it as the “immigration industrial complex.”306 To
Gonzales, the anti-migrant bloc consists of “a contradictory and fluid
constellation of forces composed of elected officials, state bureaucrats, think
tanks, intellectuals, and charismatic media personalities who, under the
influence of strategic fractions of global capital, have set the boundaries of the
immigration debate around narrow questions of criminality and antiterrorism.”307 Golash-Boza explains that “[t]he immigration industrial complex
refers to the public and private sector interests in the criminalization of
undocumented migration, immigration law enforcement and the promotion of
‘anti-illegal’ rhetoric.”308 For their part, Doty and Wheatley claim that “the
contemporary immigration industrial complex is a massive, multifaceted, and
POST (May 15, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2015/05/15/clintonsinaccurate-claim-that-immigrant-detention-facilities-have-a-legal-requirement-to-fill-beds.
304. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA CIVIL IMMIGRATION DETENTION STANDARDS 1
(2012) (explaining that ICE’s civil immigration detention system is based on correctional norms,
then explaining that the guidelines “set forth below are intended to provide a tool that will guide
DHS in the transition to a comprehensive civil detention system that does not primarily make use
of jails and jail-like facilities”); Mark Noferi, New ABA Civil Immigration Detention Standards:
Does “Civil” Mean Better Detention or Less Detention?, CRIMMIGRATION (Aug. 28, 2012, 9:00
AM), http://crimmigration.com/2012/08/28/new-aba-civil-immigration-detention-standards-doescivil-mean-better-detention-or-less-detention.aspx (noting that ICE’s 2011 detention standards
“while still citing model jail standards . . . were a step forward,” then proceeding to identify
numerous shortcomings in the 2011 standards).
305. See Cornelisse, supra note 301, at 101 (arguing that most critics of immigration
detention in Europe attack the conditions of confinement but not the use of detention itself). The
collection of essays in BEYOND WALLS AND CAGES, supra note 85, is an important exception.
306. GONZALES, supra note 283, at 5; Roxanne Lynne Doty & Elizabeth Shannon
Wheatley, Private Detention and the Immigration Industrial Complex, 7 INT’L POL. SOC. 426, 427
(2013); Tanya Golash-Boza, The Immigration Industrial Complex: Why We Enforce Immigration
Policies Destined to Fail, 3 SOC. COMPASS 295, 296 (2009).
307. GONZALES, supra note 283, at 5.
308. Golash-Boza, supra note 306, at 296.
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intricate economy of power, which is composed of a widespread, diverse, and
self-perpetuating collection of organizations, laws, ideas, and actors” that
“mutually reinforce one another and expand the realms of authority to which
people are subjected.”309 Though each of these scholars presents a different
analysis of contemporary immigration law enforcement, they all identify a
broad array of actors that have collectively framed discussions of immigration
around notions of danger. These actors have then used that discursive
framework of danger to promote legislation and policy initiatives intended to
contain the danger. Part V identifies the actual actors, policy choices, and legal
directives that have converted the rhetoric of criminality into the practice of
immigration imprisonment.
V.
ENTRENCHING IMMIGRATION IMPRISONMENT
Immigration imprisonment is undoubtedly rooted in political responses to
the rhetoric of migrant criminality. In this Part, I show that immigration
imprisonment has become embedded in the practices of numerous
governmental and nongovernmental institutions, as well as in interpretations of
statutory directives and ambiguities.
There are three primary phenomena that constantly drive immigration
imprisonment. First, having thoroughly embraced the rhetoric of criminality
and its view of migrants as threatening, government authorities have repeatedly
adopted policy choices that expand imprisonment even in the face of
reasonable alternatives. They have become locked into imprisonment as a
policy. Second, immigration-policing agencies, as institutions are prone to do,
consistently interpret imprisonment imperatives in a way that expands their
own power. Federal and state authorities have created an immigration
imprisonment dragnet out of a modicum of statutory authority to imprison.
Third, a host of third parties have developed to facilitate immigration
imprisonment. In their own way, each of these institutions pressures legislators
to maintain and expand imprisonment.
A. Path Dependence
“Institutions,” wrote the political scientist Claus Offe in his study of
decision making within political institutions, “can breed conservatism.”310 The
institutions involved in immigration imprisonment are no exception. Whether
at the federal, state, or local level, people operating within larger institutional
cultures make the myriad decisions that affect imprisonment. The values and

309.
310.

Doty & Wheatley, supra note 306, at 438.
See Claus Offe, Political Institutions and Social Power: Conceptual Explorations, in
RETHINKING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: THE ART OF THE STATE 9, 18 (Ian Shapiro et al. eds.,
2006).
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processes of the existing institutional culture constrain the choices available to
each of these individuals.311
One of the most poignant features of any institutional culture is the effect
of previous policy decisions on future decisions.312 A truly naturalized policy
choice reinforces itself by, in part, determining future policy developments.313
Referred to as the theory of “path dependence,” this phenomenon suggests that
some “decision[s] limit[] the range of available options at subsequent points
and, in so doing, encourage[] continuity in the form of a retention of the
original choice.”314 In effect, the actions of government actors—whether
elected politicians or employed civil servants—are limited by what those actors
envision possible.315 As political scientist R. Kent Weaver explains,
governmental policies become “‘sticky,’ if not ‘locked in’ . . . . [O]nce policy
regimes have become deeply embedded, policy change should be primarily
within the parameters of that regime.”316 This is not to say that policy shifts are
impossible, only that “reversal may be rendered more difficult by the pathdependent effect.”317 To gauge whether institutions have adopted a pathdependent policy-making approach, political scientist and historian Randall
Hansen argues that it is necessary to examine whether “policy divergence was
considered and rejected for reasons that cannot be explained without reference
to the structure of costs and incentives created by the original policy choice.”318
The discursive link between crime and immigration suggests that pathdependence theory can help explain the evolution of immigrationimprisonment practices. For the last thirty years or so, the culture of
governmental discussions on immigration has portrayed migrants as
deviants.319 The rhetoric of criminality that now pervades has not always
framed immigration law. Importantly, it only came to be this way through
deliberate choices by key actors in and out of government.320 As a result,
311. See John Ferejohn, Practical Institutionalism, in RETHINKING POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 310, at 72, 79.
312. See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective, 21 COMP. POL.
STUD. 66, 67 (1988).
313. RANDALL HANSEN, CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION IN POST-WAR BRITAIN: THE
INSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF A MULTICULTURAL NATION 30 (2000); Krasner, supra note 312, at
71.
314. HANSEN, supra note 313, at 31; see also Brant T. Lee, The Network Economic Effects
of Whiteness, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1281 (2004) (“[O]nce random historical events set the
market on a particular path, the choice may become locked-in, regardless of the advantages of the
alternatives.”).
315. See Krasner, supra note 312, at 83.
316. R. Kent Weaver, Government Institutions, Policy Cartels, and Policy Change, in
RETHINKING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 310, at 216, 223.
317. HANSEN, supra note 313, at 31; see also Brant T. Lee, supra note 314, at 1282 (noting
that investment in a particular standard creates “switching costs” that make adopting an alternative
course more difficult).
318. HANSEN, supra note 313, at 32.
319. See supra Part IV.A.
320. See id.
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immigration law enforcement, including imprisonment, is now conceived of as
a security issue.321 Viewed as part of the state’s efforts to keep the public safe,
immigration imprisonment has come to be seen as a necessary component of
government operations. Without strenuously wielding the power of
imprisonment, the government would be thought to fail its essential duty of
ensuring public safety.322
A prime example of this discursive phenomenon publicly manifested
itself in February 2013. That month, ICE officials released 2,228 detainees due
to budget cuts resulting from Congress’s failure to enact an appropriations bill.
Before releasing these individuals, ICE conducted public safety and flight risk
assessments and released only those presenting a low probability of both risks.
Despite that, prominent members of Congress illustrated how the rhetoric of
criminality locks legislators into favoring imprisonment. Speaker of the House
of Representatives John Boehner said that ICE’s actions “let[] criminals go
free.”323 His Republican colleague Bob Goodlatte, chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, added, “By releasing criminal immigrants onto the
streets, the administration is needlessly endangering American lives.”324
Boehner, Goodlatte, and others who made similar claims did so despite the fact
that approximately half of all detainees have not been convicted of any crime
and of those that have been, few have been convicted of a violent offense.325
Critically, these legislators view migrants as dangerous and thus believe it
appropriate for the government to mitigate this risk through imprisonment.
Having thoroughly subscribed to the rhetoric of criminality and the policy
choice of incarceration, they view a failure to keep these migrants confined as
synonymous with failing to protect the public.
The rhetoric of criminality has similarly locked DHS into viewing its
immigration law enforcement efforts—among which imprisonment stands
out—as critical to public safety, and therefore necessary. As DHS Secretary
Jeh Johnson put it, “Homeland security is the most important mission any
government can provide to its people.”326 Two of the five operational areas that
the department lists as its “core missions” concern immigration-related
activities that subject substantial numbers of people to immigration

321. WILSHER, supra note 257, at 207; see also Borderlands Autonomous Collective, supra
note 84, at 196.
322. See Lawston & Murillo, supra note 84 183 (“The use of the language ‘criminal’ and
‘lawbreakers’ effectively justifies the bellicose posturing of anti-immigrant discourses and
practices.”).
323. Lindsey Boerma, Reason for Mass Release of Illegal Immigrants “Hard to Believe,”
Boehner Says, CBS NEWS (Feb. 26, 2013, 6:55 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/reason-formass-release-of-illegal-immigrants-hard-to-believe-boehner-says.
324. Kirk Semple, Mass Release of Immigrants is Tied to Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013,
at A1.
325. SCHRIRO, supra note 5, at 6.
326. DHS BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FY 2015, supra note 183, at n.p. (Secretary’s Message)
(emphasis in original).
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imprisonment.327 In addition to operating the nation’s civil immigrationdetention system, DHS’s ICE and CBP units identify and apprehend the bulk of
people incarcerated due to alleged immigration law violations. Like their parent
department, both Agencies view their work as critical to public safety. ICE, the
principal Agency that pushes people into civil immigration detention, claims
that its “primary mission is to promote homeland security and public safety.” 328
For his part, the CBP commissioner claims that the Agency’s mission is
“keeping dangerous people and dangerous things away from the American
homeland.”329 CBP agents identify most of the migrants who are placed in
criminal immigration detention.
Viewing its work as essential to the nation’s security, DHS has
implemented a series of initiatives that have dramatically increased the number
of people detained on suspicion of immigration law violations. Reflecting a
path-dependent course, most of these efforts have been created on the
department’s initiative, suggesting an unwillingness to diverge from the
immigration-imprisonment policy choice.330 For one, DHS created Secure
Communities, one of the programs most responsible for the size of today’s
migrant prisoner population, without any obvious external impetus to do so.
Indeed, it remains unclear what, if any, legal authority DHS has to run this
program.331 As legal scholar Anil Kalhan explains, “No statute unquestionably
authorizes the program or mandates state and local participation, and no
regulations specifically govern its operations.”332 The department created
Secure Communities after Congress gave DHS money to “improve and
modernize efforts to identify aliens convicted of a crime, sentenced to
imprisonment, and who may be deportable.”333 Given the broad congressional
command to “improve and modernize” identification measures, DHS could
have created a program that led to little detention. It could, for example, have
followed the congressional directive to focus on migrants who have previously
been convicted of crimes, rather than almost everyone who comes into contact
with police officers. In addition, DHS could have elected to track potentially
deportable migrants through alternatives to detention. Instead, DHS took this
327. See, e.g., Our Mission: Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.
http://www.dhs.gov/our-mission (last visited Sept. 10, 2015) (explaining that two of what the
department describes as its five “core missions” concern immigration: border security and
immigration-law enforcement).
328. What We Do, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, http://www.ice.gov/overview
(last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
329. U.S. BORDER PATROL, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., 2012–2016 BORDER PATROL
STRATEGIC PLAN 4 (2012).
330. See HANSEN, supra note 313, at 32.
331. See Kalhan, supra note 238, at 1130.
332. See id.
333. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURE
COMMUNITIES: CRASH COURSE 4 (2009), in SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: PRESENTATIONS
2 (2010) [hereinafter CRASH COURSE], http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities
/securecommunitiespresentations.pdf.
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vague congressional instruction to improve and modernize identification
processes and launched a law enforcement program that identifies migrants
well before a conviction and sentence could possibly be imposed—at the point
when a migrant is booked into police custody.334 By checking the immigration
status of every person taken into police custody whose identification
information has been sent to the FBI, Secure Communities allows DHS to limit
the possibility that a migrant will be released from incarceration.335 In effect,
Secure Communities paves the road from penal to civil confinement for no
reason except that the department is unable or unwilling to imagine policies
that diverge from its focus on imprisonment.
Likewise, the former INS created another key imprisonment program,
CAP, in response to statutory language that was anything but a clear mandate
to imprison. As part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA), Congress instructed the INS to “expeditiously” begin deportation
proceedings against migrants convicted of deportable offenses.336 Two years
later, the INS established a pair of programs—the Institutional Removal
Program (IRP) and the Alien Criminal Apprehension Program (ACAP)—that
would eventually become CAP.337 The IRP and ACAP both sought to remove
people who were already incarcerated as a result of a criminal conviction.338
Nothing in the statutory text requires more, but that is exactly the path that
immigration law enforcement officials followed. Today, CAP operates much
more expansively than IRCA commanded. Instead of waiting for a conviction,
CAP targets migrants as soon as they are booked into police custody—well
before a conviction is possible—and sometimes earlier in the law enforcement
process.339 Its broader reach means that CAP frequently leads to arrests and
criminal indictments.340 CAP therefore demonstrates how the choice to
perceive immigration enforcement as a security concern means that every
immigration violator is a threat, and so a violation—without anything more—
justifies detention.
Similarly, DHS’s approach to a law enforcement program authorized by
statute, the 287(g) agreement initiative, suggests a solitary policing focus that
relies ever-more heavily on imprisonment. The statute allows DHS to enter into
agreements with local law enforcement agencies through which local officers
are granted the power to investigate, apprehend, or detain migrants.341 Though

334. ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 174, at 13.
335. See CRASH COURSE, supra note 333, at 7.
336. See ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 174, at 12 (discussing Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 701, 100 Stat. 3359, 3445 (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012))).
337. Id. at 13.
338. See id at 12.
339. See id. at 13, 17 tbl.4.
340. See id. at 14.
341. INA § 287(g)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1).
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detention is one of the powers available, the statute does not require DHS to
take priority over investigation or apprehension. It could have used the 287(g)
program to identify potentially removable individuals and initiate removal
proceedings without emphasizing detention. Instead, the department chose to
harness 287(g)’s detention potential. As then-ICE Assistant Secretary John
Morton explained in 2009, 287(g) allows the Agency to better accomplish its
“key enforcement priorities—the arrest and detention of criminal aliens who
pose the greatest threat to the public safety or danger to the community.”342
Given the securitization prism through which DHS officials see their
work, they are not likely to alter the practices that lead hundreds of thousands
of people into the detention and deportation pipeline each year.343 Indeed, with
immigration framed as a threat, scaling back enforcement tactics to any
significant degree would be tantamount to DHS abdicating its responsibility to
protect the homeland. Secretary Johnson’s comments about the number of
people that constitute “public safety, national security, [or] border security
threats” and therefore merit placement in civil immigration detention, illustrate
this point. According to Johnson, DHS needs to accommodate 30,539 migrants
who fit this risk assessment.344 That is a reduction of 3,461 beds from the
thirty-four thousand beds Congress currently requires it to maintain.345 Though
notable, this reduction represents a mere 10 percent of the federal government’s
daily capacity for civil immigration detention. Moreover, Johnson did not
explain why DHS needed to hold almost 31,000 migrants in detention given
that only a small number of the people it currently detains have been convicted
of a violent crime.346 Nor did he address why migrants convicted of a violent
offense or otherwise could not be supervised through alternative means.
Relatedly, the department has steadfastly failed to expand its use of ATD
despite repeated calls by internal and external observers to do so.347 In 2009,
for example, ICE’s ATD programs had the capacity to supervise eighteen
thousand people.348 By fiscal year 2014, the Agency’s ATD capacity had
342.
343.

CAPPS ET AL., supra note 214, at 6 n.6.
Cf. OTTO SANTA ANA, BROWN TIDE RISING: METAPHORS OF LATINOS IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE 35 (2002) (“Replacement of a dominant
metaphor involves overcoming a great deal of inertia. . . . [P]eople are extremely resistant to
changes, and often will not even temporarily entertain alternative perspectives.”).
344. Johnson reportedly said that the department “asked for something like 30,600 beds to
detain who we believe needs to be detained.” Esther Yu-Hsi Lee, Homeland Security Head Insists
“Bed Mandate” Is Not a Quota to Fill Detention Centers, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 12, 2014, 4:42
PM), http://thinkprogress.org/immigration/2014/03/12/3391911/jeh-johnson-bed-mandate-quota.
The actual number of beds that DHS has asked Congress to fund is 30,539. ICE FY 2015 Budget
Justification, supra note 65, at 40.
345. Lee, supra note 344.
346. SCHRIRO, supra note 5, at 6.
347. See, e.g., id. at 20–21 (recommending that ICE “develop a nationwide implementation
plan for the ATD program plan this fall” and noting that more people would be good candidates
for ATD programs if ICE partnered with community organizations).
348. See id. at 20 (providing ATD data).
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grown only slightly to twenty-two thousand.349 The Agency’s ATD options
vary in their restrictiveness of migrants’ movements, but all impose
significantly fewer restrictions than detention and have an impressive rate of
success at encouraging migrants’ appearance at court hearings—a 93.8 percent
appearance rate in fiscal year 2010 according to ICE.350 These alternatives
could help DHS reach its goal of ensuring that migrants depart the United
States if ordered to do so and at a fraction of the cost.351 Despite that, DHS has
never placed much emphasis on growing its ATD capacity, again suggesting
that it is locked into its imprisonment focus.352
The department’s position on a congressional requirement to maintain
thirty-four thousand detention beds suggests a similar path-dependent approach
to imprisonment. The appropriations act President Obama signed into law in
January 2014 provides that DHS “shall maintain a level of not less than 34,000
detention beds.”353 Budget bills stretching back to 2010 have included similar
language.354 DHS has consistently taken the position that this language requires
it to detain thirty-four thousand migrants each day. The text, however, does not
reference the number of detainees. Instead, the text merely requires DHS to pay
for the specified number of beds. DHS Secretary Johnson recently
acknowledged this alternative reading of the budget’s text,355 but the
department has not acted on this recognition by shifting away from detention.
That the department interprets the congressionally authored text in a way that
leads to mass imprisonment suggests that Agency actors have locked
themselves into this position and struggle to follow other possibilities, even
possibilities written into the statute.

349.
350.

ICE FY 2015 Budget Justification, supra note 65, at 60.
See SCHRIRO, supra note 5, at 20; ICE FY 2012 Budget Justification, supra note 66, at

44.
351. See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
353. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. F, tit. II, 128 Stat. 5,
251.
354. See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 1136, div. D, tit. II, 127 Stat. 198, 347 (using identical language); Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, div. D, tit. II, 125 Stat. 786, 950 (same); Continuing Appropriations
Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-242, 124 Stat. 2607 (codified at scattered sections of 5, 20 & 42
U.S.C.) (continuing appropriations enacted for the 2010 fiscal year); Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, tit. II, 123 Stat. 2142, 2149 (providing
“[t]hat funding made available under this heading shall maintain a level of not less than 33,400
detention beds”). None of the appropriations bills enacted for the 2009 fiscal year include similar
language. See Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524; American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, tit. VI, 123 Stat. 115, 163;
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L.
No. 110-329, div. D, tit. II, 122 Stat. 3574, 3659 (codified at scattered sections of 26 & 49
U.S.C.). The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 also lacks language requiring a specific
number of detention beds. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E,
tit. II, 121 Stat. 1844, 2051.
355. Lee, supra note 344.
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Diverging from immigration imprisonment would require DHS to
overcome the values and processes that lead to its large-scale civil immigration
detention practice.356 The path-dependent choices department officials have
made for years, however, make reversal all the more difficult.357 For one,
shifting away from imprisonment would require that DHS empty thousands of
prison beds that Congress currently requires it to pay for and that it has made a
habit of filling. Without question, this would create an unpleasant publicrelations affair for department officials because of the widespread belief that
detention is needed to ensure public safety and migrants’ appearances at court
hearings. It would also require a fundamental reimagining of how immigration
officials view available prison beds. ICE officers view unused prison beds as
beds that need to be filled.358 At times, they even gauge their enforcement
measures based on available detention space, an NFOP practice verified by the
department’s inspector general.359 DHS, therefore, is quite unlikely to diverge
from its profound commitment to imprisonment as a key immigration law
enforcement tool.
Instead of diverging from their practice of heavily using imprisonment as
a means of enforcing immigration law, DHS officials debate the contours of
detention. They regularly consider the conditions of confinement, the most
suitable locations for prisons, the cost of detention, and even the best number
of people to confine. This constant reexamination of detention gives Agency
officials the aura of self-critique. To be sure, these are important issues that
deserve attention. What this line of inquiry does not do, however, is challenge
the presumption that imprisonment is necessary.
B. Institutional Auto-Expansion
Relatedly, institutions tend to take an expansive view of their own
authority—that is, once they acquire power, they are prone to try to hold onto
it.360 This phenomenon appears repeatedly in the immigration-imprisonment
context, in which both federal agencies and state governments have taken
expansive views of their own authority, even in the face of statutory language
indicating that is not required.361

356. See Ferejohn, supra note 311, at 79.
357. See Lee, supra note 314, at 1282.
358. See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 214, at 3 (“287(g) officers and ICE supervisors report
that ample ICE detention capacity . . . allows officials to place detainers on as many Level 3 and
traffic offenders as they encounter.”); Sarah Gryll, Comment, Immigration Detention Reform: No
Band-Aid Desired, 60 EMORY L.J. 1211, 1232 (2011) (“ICE officers likely would have detained
those women and children if, when encountered, adequate detention space had been available for
them.”).
359. FOT ASSESSMENT, supra note 174, at 13–14.
360. See Ernest Gellhord & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 992 (1999).
361. For a similar argument in the United Kingdom, see BOSWORTH, supra note 302, at 25.
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First, ICE and its predecessor, the INS, have taken a broad view of their
detention authority; this view has manifested itself in ways Congress did not
require. For example, the INS took the position—since rejected by the Supreme
Court—that the INA allowed it to indefinitely detain migrants deemed a flight
or safety risk after they had been ordered removed.362 ICE continues to take the
position that it can detain any migrant indefinitely before the migrant has been
ordered removed, though a growing number of courts have disagreed.363 The
Agency also takes the view that Congress requires it to detain thirty-four
thousand people per day, though the text enacted into law actually references a
certain number of beds that it must pay for each day and says nothing about
people.364
Second, the Justice Department has likewise taken a broad view of the
statutory power to detain migrants. In a 2009 decision, the Justice
Department’s BIA held that the INA’s command that DHS “take into custody”
anyone subject to a broad range of removal grounds cannot be satisfied by
anything short of detention.365 By interpreting Congress’s use of the term
“custody” as synonymous with “detention,” the BIA adopted only one of
multiple reasonable interpretations of the statute.366 It could just as reasonably
have concluded that detention is merely one among many forms of custody.367
Though it was presented with this option, it instead took a route that results in
more detention.368 The extraordinariness of the BIA’s use of imprisonment as
an option of choice is illustrated by the stance of another Justice Department
unit, the INS, twenty years earlier. In the late 1980s, when immigration
imprisonment was just emerging as a central tool of immigration law
enforcement, an INS spokesman explained, “To be in detention doesn’t mean
that you have to be behind a fence.”369 Now that BIA has naturalized decades

362. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688–89 (2001) (discussing government’s argument
about application of INA § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000)).
363. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding a
preliminary injunction requiring bond hearings before an immigration judge of all detainees held
longer than six months); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 229–35 (3d Cir. 2011)
(disagreeing with “[t]he Government[’s] assert[ion] that [the INA’s mandatory detention
provision] says that aliens can be detained for as long as removal proceedings are ‘pending,’ even
if they are ‘pending’ for prolonged periods of time”); Reid v. Donelan, 297 F.R.D. 185, 187 (D.
Mass. 2014) (certifying a class of individuals who are detained by ICE in Massachusetts for over
six months without an individualized bond determination); Reid v. Donelan, 991 F. Supp. 2d 275,
280–82 (D. Mass. 2014) (holding that individuals detained more than six months are entitled to a
bond hearing before an immigration judge).
364. See Lee, supra note 344.
365. Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 747, 752 (B.I.A. 2009) (discussing INA § 236, 8
U.S.C. § 1226 (2008)).
366. See García Hernández, supra note 299, at 1408–10.
367. See id.
368. See Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 752.
369. KAHN, supra note 109, at 204.
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of immigration imprisonment, the position taken by the INS of 1989 seems a
long way away.
Third, states have at times exercised their detention power broadly to
reach a broader range of migrants. Arizona, for example, not only took the
unusual step of prosecuting migrants under the State’s human-smuggling
provision but also sought to limit the ability of migrants imprisoned on
suspicion of violating a serious felony (which the legislature defined to include
human smuggling) to leave jail.370 Numerous other states have also adopted
substantive laws and procedural rules that have expanded the possible bases for
incarceration due to immigration-related activity.371
C. Third Party Pressure
Having locked itself into the policy choice of using imprisonment to
enforce immigration law, the federal government has—perhaps inadvertently—
created a body of third parties dependent on that policy choice. While
governmental authorities remain critical of the immigration-imprisonment
phenomenon, “the state does not act on its own as if it were a monolithic and
homogenous institution but through a bloc of actors that operate at the nexus
between the state and civil society.”372 In particular, a host of private prison
corporations, local- and foreign-government entities, financial investors,
service providers, and prison employees have coalesced to make immigration
imprisonment possible. This is not a surprising development. As Weaver
observed in his analysis of government institutions, “[o]nce in place, policy
regimes tend to spawn supportive coalitions.”373 The existence of these third
parties in turn makes divergence from the prevailing imprisonment focus much
more difficult. “Changes,” Weaver adds, “are likely to impose costs on
politicians, program clientele, and implementers who have adapted their
expectations and strategies to the current policy regime.”374 Indeed, the entities
that have grown around the immigration-imprisonment regime have become
deeply invested in its maintenance and have implicitly encouraged government
officials to take expansive views of their imprisonment authority.375
Perhaps there is no group that more vividly evokes a commitment to
imprisonment than the private prison companies that own or operate a large
percentage of the immigration-detention estate. Private prison companies
oversee almost 17.8 percent of all federal prisoners (a significant and growing
percentage of whom are imprisoned for committing immigration crimes) and,

370. See supra notes 118–33 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 135–44 and accompanying text.
372. GONZALES, supra note 283, at 100.
373. Weaver, supra note 316, at 223.
374. Id.; see also Krasner, supra note 312, at 84 (“Once a choice is made, other institutions
reorient themselves or new services are created.”).
375. See Gellhord & Verkuil, supra note 360, at 992.
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in any given year, between 40 and 50 percent of civil immigration detainees.376
As profit-making enterprises, private prison companies seek the greatest return
on their investments. To be profitable, therefore, they must keep costs down
while maximizing revenues. An obvious way of maintaining robust revenue is
to “ensure that prisons are not only built but also filled.”377 News reports claim
that private prison companies tried to do this by engaging in “a quiet, behindthe-scenes effort to help draft and pass Arizona Senate Bill 1070,” the
infamous state law that the Supreme Court eventually held was largely
unconstitutional, and that would have resulted in a vast expansion of Arizona’s
criminalization of immigration activity.378 In addition, the Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA), GEO Group, and other private prison
companies have vigorously lobbied lawmakers. Collectively, from 2005 to
early 2013, private prison companies spent approximately $45 million lobbying
state and federal politicians, including key lawmakers who have advanced
proposals that would have expanded civil and criminal immigration
imprisonment.379
Though the largest prison corporations publicly disclaim any interest in
expanding the prison population, their financial records indicate a keen
awareness that more punitive laws improve their financial condition while a
more relaxed approach toward immigration law enforcement could undermine
their financial health. CCA, the nation’s largest private prison operator, for
example, told its shareholders in 2004 that “[f]urther [revenue] growth is
expected to come from increased focus and resources by the Department of
Homeland Security dedicated to illegal immigration,” among other sources.380
376. See E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 239808,
PRISONERS IN 2011, at 32 app. tbl.15 (2012) (providing federal inmate data for 2011); CODY
MASON, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DOLLARS AND DETAINEES: THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT
DETENTION 5 (2012) (providing ICE data for 2002–2012).
377. Ken Silverstein, America’s Private Gulag, in THE CELLING OF AMERICA: AN INSIDE
LOOK AT THE U.S. PRISON INDUSTRY 156, 158 (Daniel Burton-Rose et al. eds., 1998); see also
Christine Bacon, The Evolution of Immigration Detention in the UK: The Involvement of Private
Prison Companies 17 (Refugee Studies Ctr., RSC Working Paper No. 27, 2005) (“There is
concern among some scholars that private correctional corporations may attempt to increase the
number of those incarcerated.”).
378. Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, NPR (Oct. 28,
2010, 11:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2010/10/28/130833741/prison-economics-help-drive-arizimmigration-law; see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (upholding
Ariz. S.B. 1070 section 2(B), which requires a police officer to check the immigration status of all
people stopped, detained, or arrested if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the
individual is unlawfully present in the United States).
379. See Sasha Chavkin, Immigration Reform and Private Prison Cash: Key Lawmakers in
the Immigration Debate Are Among the Top Recipients of Campaign Contributions From the
Prison Industry, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.cjr.org/united_states
_project/key_senators_on_immigration_get_campaign_cash_from_prison_companies.php (citing
the Associated Press).
380. Geiza Vargas-Vargas, Comment, White Investment in Black Bondage, 27 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 41, 41 (2005) (citing Corrs. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 16 (Mar. 12,
2004) (second alteration in original)).
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In 2013, the second-largest prison company, GEO Group, announced that
“[i]mmigration reform laws which are currently a focus for legislators and
politicians at the federal, state and local level also could materially adversely
impact us.”381
Though private corporations are heavily involved in immigration
imprisonment today, local governments also reap financial rewards from this
practice. Many elected officials, especially in rural locations, view prisons as
economic engines.382 Prisons in which migrants are detained are no different.
Indeed, immigration prisons are particularly attractive to local political leaders
because the federal government pays almost all of the costs of detention. This
arrangement allows county and city governments to readily develop
immigration prison revenue streams. The mayor of Oakdale, Louisiana, the
largest town in a parish (the Louisiana equivalent of counties) of roughly 7,200
people, vigorously lobbied INS officials during the mid-1980s to open an
immigration prison there.383 The prison, Mayor George Mowad explained,
“would lead to the ‘economic rebirth’ of Oakdale.”384 As the mayor saw it,
“[i]mmigration prisons . . . are ‘a recession-proof industry,’ because if the U.S.
economy suffered, the world economy would follow, which would lead to
more undocumented aliens coming to the United States, and thus more
employment for Oakdale.”385 Similarly, a county commissioner in
Pennsylvania’s Perry County explained, “We tried like the dickens to get some
of those Chinese,” referring to Chinese migrants who had recently been
apprehended aboard a grounded ship.386 “We thought at one point that we were
going to get 30 of them, but it didn’t pan out. We told the Immigration Service
we were willing to help them out of a spot. Maybe then they’d help us out of a
spot. . . . The big reason we’re doing all this is because we want to keep
everybody [at the prison] working.”387 In a similar vein, the chairman of the
Board of Commissioners of Irwin County in South Georgia lamented the
prospect of a privately owned immigration prison closing: “If it closes, then
everybody loses their jobs . . . and the inmates go back to wherever they came
from, but we hope that it never gets to that.”388 It did come to that at the
Willacy County Correctional Center, a south Texas facility run by the private
prison operator Management Training Corporation (MTC). After years of
381. The GEO Grp., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4) 31 (Nov. 7, 2013).
382. See Doris Marie Provine, Race and Inequality in the War on Drugs, 7 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 41, 54 (2011).
383. See KAHN, supra note 109, at 151–52.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Matt Miller, Prison Board Shopping for Inmates to Prevent Lay-offs, PATRIOT-NEWS
(Harrisburg, Pa.), June 22, 1993, at A4 (brackets in original).
387. Id.
388. Jeremy Redmon, ICE Detention Center Struggling Financially, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(Apr. 23, 2012, 3:36 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/ice-detention-center-strugglingfinancially/nQTFZ.
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operating as a civil immigration detention center for ICE (called the Willacy
County Processing Center), Willacy housed convicted immigration crime
offenders for BOP when inmates rebelled in February 2015. Roughly two
weeks after the rebellion, MTC announced that it was firing all but about
twenty-five members of its approximately four-hundred-person staff.389
Often, local governments pair up with private prison companies to jointly
facilitate the development of an immigration prison. Border analyst Tom Barry
explains that these “public-private prison[s]” are “publicly owned by local
governments, privately operated by corporations, publicly financed by taxexempt bonds, and located in [economically] depressed communities.”390 The
public-private consortium then turns its attention to securing an agreement with
one of the various federal government agencies involved in immigration
imprisonment—ICE, BOP, or USMS. The federal government receives prison
beds while the local governments and private operators receive revenue.391
Importantly, because public-private prison partnerships leave ownership in the
local government’s hands, the public entities remain liable for financial
shortfalls that arise when the revenue stream falls below the level necessary to
operate or maintain the facility—that is, when there are not enough inmates to
meet prison expenses.392 Local officials, therefore, have every reason to
pressure the federal government to maintain a steady supply of immigration
prisoners.393
Neither private businesses nor local governments, however, can carry the
cost of building and operating prisons alone.394 On the contrary, they rely
heavily on financial investors to make the risk that goes along with such
389. Aaron Nelsen, Prison Company: Inmates in Willacy County May Have Planned Riot,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Mar. 2, 2015, 6:40 PM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news
/local/article/Prison-in-Willacy-County-to-lay-off-all-employees-6110137.php; Fernando del
Valle, Willacy County Braces for Prison Layoffs, VALLEY MORNING STAR (Harlingen, Tex.)
(Mar. 6, 2015, 10:45 PM), http://www.valleymorningstar.com/premium/article_ce6c250c-c48411e4-b01d-57658f494172.html; Willacy County Prison Plans to Lay Off 200 Workers Monday,
VALLEYCENTRAL.COM (Mar. 9, 2015, 12:08 PM), http://www.valleycentral.com/news/story
.aspx?id=1174897.
390. TOM BARRY, BORDER WARS 4–5 (2011).
391. Id. at 15.
392. See id. at 45–46.
393. See Allen Essex, New Prisoners Begin Arriving at “Tent City,” THE MONITOR
(McAllen, Tex.) (Oct. 10, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.themonitor.com/news/local/newprisoners-begin-arriving-at-tent-city/article_c958cc6d-e46e-56ab-926d-b8a747f6db32.html
(noting that Willacy County, Texas, would receive $1.3 million per year if a county-owned,
privately run prison contracted to BOP to house criminal immigration prisoners housed 1,380 per
day, but $2.3 million if it housed 1,381 or more prisoners); Charles Murphy, Glades County
Sheriff to Close Jail Facility; Says Federal Government Cut Back on Arrests of Illegal Immigrants
and Large Jail Facility is Losing Money; 100 Jobs Lost, GLADES CNTY. DEMOCRAT (Glades
Cnty., Fla.) (Apr. 9, 2014, 1:34 PM), http://florida.newszap.com/gladescounty/131120-113/glades
-county-sheriff-to-close-jail-facilitysays-federal-government-cut-back-on-arrests-of-illegal-i
(reporting that the sheriff of Glades County, Florida, blamed ICE for the county’s inability to
afford to keep the county jail open).
394. See Silverstein, supra note 377, at 162.
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complicated projects worthwhile. Financial institutions such as banks provide
the capital necessary to build, refurbish, or expand prisons.395 Indeed, major
banks in the United States have taken important, though indirect, roles in
immigration imprisonment by supporting the private prison companies and
local governments that actually build or operate these facilities. Wells Fargo,
for example, invests in the GEO Group and also manages CCA’s financial
restructuring.
VI.
DENATURALIZING IMMIGRATION IMPRISONMENT
Despite its central presence in modern immigration law enforcement,
incarceration is undeniably an extraordinary power. It is a “severe sanction,” as
the Supreme Court has put it on multiple occasions.396 Short of the state’s
authority to take a person’s life, it is the most awesome power that the state
wields.397 Acknowledging that incarceration necessarily entails a severe
deprivation of liberty that sharply departs from the western legal tradition’s
otherwise strong claim to respect a person’s liberty,398 the Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized that people have a “constitutionally protected interest in
avoiding physical restraint.”399
To better reflect the extraordinary character of imprisonment, its proper
place in enforcing immigration law should be at the sidelines.400 It should, at
most, represent the margins of governmental authority. In the context of civil
immigration law, confinement should be prohibited unless the government can
provide clear, articulable facts indicating that a particular migrant represents a
danger to the public or a risk of flight that cannot be substantially ameliorated
by alternative means, as is already the case for pretrial detention of criminal
defendants. The same standard ought to apply to pretrial detention in the
criminal immigration context.
Upon conviction for an immigration crime, incarceration ought to be
permitted only to the extent that it accomplishes some goal that the civil
immigration law enforcement system cannot.401 Since neither criminal nor civil

395. See Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, Private Security Companies and the European
Borderscapes, in THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 152, 167 (Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & Ninna Nyberg Sørensen
eds., 2013).
396. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 762 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372 (1979).
397. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991).
398. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
399. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 553 (2003) (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
690 (2001)).
400. See Noferi, supra note 304 (promoting less civil immigration detention).
401. See Victor C. Romero, Decriminalizing Border Crossings, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
273, 279–80 (2010) (positing that using criminal powers “when civil penalties will do offends
constitutional safeguards of individual liberty by tempting law enforcement to overreach”).
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immigration law enforcement has much of a deterrent effect, and since
imprisonment incapacitates a detained individual whether through civil or
penal detention, incarceration after conviction of an immigration crime should
be restricted to situations in which confinement promotes criminal law’s
retributive justification. Whether retributivist aims are served must be
considered in light of the reality that many unauthorized migrants come to the
United States not of their own volition (as is the case of migrants brought as
children)402 or for morally commendable reasons (e.g., to escape violence).403
Given that imprisonment for immigration crimes is largely ineffective as a
deterrent and that many migrants break the law for morally justifiable reasons,
it would be appropriate to significantly reduce the sentences meted out for
these crimes. It would even be fitting to decriminalize unauthorized border
crossings unless “the federal government can prove that, with requisite criminal
intent, [a migrant] engaged in an act aside from crossing the border that would
constitute a crime.”404 Imprisonment should, in effect, be an extraordinary
power resorted to only in the most exceptional of circumstances.
Denaturalizing immigration imprisonment may appear a tall task,
impossible or at least unrealistic in the current political environment. But it is
not a “foregone conclusion.” Imprisonment need not be a central part of the
immigration law enforcement regime.405 Just as the prison was naturalized, it
can be denaturalized.406 Recent developments in criminal incarceration offer
promising models and proof that it is possible to rewind the clock on
imprisonment policy. In late 2013, then-Attorney General Eric Holder
announced Justice Department plans to reduce the size of the federal prison
population, in part by doing what would have been unthinkable for most of the
last thirty years: “fundamentally rethinking the notion of mandatory minimum
sentences for drug-related crimes.”407 Similarly, several states, including some
known for their staunchly conservative legislatures and large prison systems,
have reduced their prison populations.408 Notably, for three years running—
from 2010 to 2012—the total federal and state prison population in the United
402. See 147 CONG. REC. 15361 (2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (introducing proposed
legislation known as the DREAM Act that “would allow children who have been brought to the
United States through no volition of their own the opportunity to fulfill their dreams, to secure a
college degree and legal status”).
403. See PORTES & RUMBAULT, supra note 44, at 23–25 (explaining that refugees and
asylees come to the United States to avoid persecution).
404. Romero, supra note 402, at 275.
405. See Feeley, supra note 248, at 333.
406. See Doty & Wheatley, supra note 306, at 430 (“This system is neither automatically
self-perpetuating nor incapable of change.”).
407. Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches
/2013/ag-speech-130812.html.
408. See, e.g., Shane Bauer, How Conservatives Learned to Love Prison Reform, MOTHER
JONES (Feb. 25, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/conservativesprison-reform-right-on-crime.
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States declined. There were almost forty-three thousand fewer people
imprisoned in federal or state prisons across the country at the end of 2012 than
at the end of 2009, the year that the number of prisoners peaked.409
Denaturalizing immigration imprisonment will not come easily. As Part V
illustrated, there are numerous impediments rooted in institutional design,
politics, and the cold realities of business affairs to turning away from
entrenched incarceration. It is difficult to imagine that any of the entities
currently involved in immigration imprisonment will voluntarily remove
themselves from this thriving practice. Only external pressure can shift the
foundations of modern immigration law enforcement.
CONCLUSION
The policy initiatives and laws that currently drive migrants into
imprisonment rely on the rhetoric of migrant criminality. Arizona’s human
smuggling crime, for example, portrays migrants who pay someone to help
them enter the United States clandestinely as conspirators in a law-breaking
enterprise. As a matter of law, they are treated identically to the people who
were paid to bring the migrants into the country. In a similar vein, fast-track
pleas, no-bail provisions, and other initiatives that radically alter traditional
criminal processes suggest that migrants are simply too dangerous for
government to rely on ordinary investigative methods. Likewise, Secure
Communities, CAP, immigration detainers, and other initiatives that break
down boundaries between criminal and civil immigration law enforcement
suggest that that the old ways of compartmentalizing enforcement efforts into
silos of substantive law are simply insufficient. And if the old ways of
enforcing law’s obligations are insufficient, then it must be because the new
threat is beyond what those traditional branches of law enforcement can police.
In response, governments at every level turned to imprisonment to
buttress their immigration law enforcement powers. In time, imprisonment
embedded itself so deeply in the nation’s collective law enforcement arsenal
that it became normal. It spawned a network of decision-making processes and
actors that reproduce the drive to imprison. But as with the development of the
prison itself, imprisonment as a form of immigration law enforcement is neither
necessary nor an enforcement mechanism that has been with us since time
immemorial. That immigration imprisonment has become naturalized is the
result of a deliberate, identifiable series of political actions to demonize
migrants—actions operationalized through policy decisions expanding the
harsh consequences of immigration activity.
Neither political actions nor policy decisions are forever. As with the
development of prisons in the first place, what is required is a willingness to
imagine a different path and the entrepreneurial spirit necessary to
409.

CARSON & GOLINELLI, supra note 8, at 1.
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operationalize it.410 Only then can immigration imprisonment return to the
aberration it once was and ought to be.

410.

See Feeley, supra note 284, at 329.

